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BAIL REFORM FOR THE ]EIGHTIES:
A REPLY TO
SENATOR KENNEDY
STEVEN DUKE*
INTRODUCTION

T

HE Bail Reform Act of 1966' may rank as the most significant legislative reform of the criminal process of this century. 2 A
product of the "New Frontier" and the "Great Society," it reflected a broad
consensus that society had the ability and the duty to alleviate tile
disadvantages caused by poverty, racism, and powerlessness. The Act
recognized that pretrial incarceration was frequently unnecessary to assure
appearance at trial and that it was unjust and discriminatory when reasonable alternatives were available. Money bail 3 was deemphasized, and the
courts were directed to release persons without it when circumstances
permitted. 4

* Professor of Law, Yale University. B.S. 1956, Arizona State University; J.D.
1959, University of Arizona; L.L.M. 1961, Yale University.
1. Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214-16 (1966) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 31413156 (1976)).
2. See generally Ervin, Foreward:Preventive Detenion-A Step Backward for
Criminal Justice, 6 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 291 (1971); Ervin, The Legislative Role
in Bail Reform, 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 429 (1967). For reports of bail studies
strongly supporting the reforms incorporated in the Bail Reform Act, see D. Freed &
P. Wald, Bail in the United States: 1964 (1964); Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 67 (1963); Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in
Philadelphia, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031 (1954); Note, A Study of the Administration of
Bail in New York City, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 693 (1958). By 1971, at least 36 states had
enacted similar reforms. See Murphy, Revision of State Bail Laws, 32 Ohio St. L.J.
451, 485 (1971).
3. Throughout the Article, "money bail" will be used broadly to include all financial conditiong required to assure appearance for trial if they involve the actual
posting with the court of cash, property, or a professional surety bond. Occasionally,
as the context will indicate, the term is employed more narrowly and excludes surety
bonds.
4. The key provision of the Bail Reform Act stipulates that in other than capital
offenses, the accused shall be ordered released until trial either on his own recognizance or upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond. If the judge requires
more assurance of appearance, he may impose the first of five conditions, and if "no
single condition gives that assurance, any combination of the ...conditions." The
conditions are: (1) third person custody; (2) restrictions on travel, association or place
of abode; (3) execution of an appearance bond and a deposit not to exceed 10% of the
face value of the bond; (4) a surety bond or cash deposit; (5) "any other condition
deemed reasonably necessary to assure appearance as required, including a condition
requiring that the person return to custody after specified hours." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3146(a) (1976).
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The Bail Reform Act, however, was not a panacea. As the focus of
reformers shifted to other areas, bail reform efforts began to ebb and
dormant forces reasserted themselves. Judges in many jurisdictions
reverted to their old practices of requiring money bail of persons who
posed any bail risks and ihflicting prohibitive bond requirements on
those suspected of being dangerous. 5 The prompt appellate review
of bail decisions, mandated by the Bail Reform Act 6 became
moribund. 7 Funding for bail studies disappeared, and service agencies so essential to the operation of a liberal
pretrial release program
8
found it increasingly difficult to function.
The Nixon administration then replaced the "\War on Poverty" with
the "War on Crime." A principal weapon of that campaign was preventive detention, the denial of pretrial release to criminal defendants
who are determined to pose " 'a clear danger to the community.' -9
Due largely to the efforts of Senator Sam Ervin, 10 an attempt to enact
a preventive detention statute was defeated, except in the District of
Columbia."' The preventive detention proposals did succeed, however, in temporarily refocusing attention on problems of pretrial incarceration. Shortcomings in the administration of the Bail Reform
Act were recognized, new studies conducted, and remedies pro12
posed.
Recently, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, virtually without
debate, 13 attached a replacement of the Bail Reform Act'14 to the
proposed Federal Criminal Code. 15 The bail provisions, incorporated in section 3502,16 were adopted by the Committee and await
5. See W. Thomas, Bail Reform in America 8, 31-32 (1976); Wald, The Right to
Bail Revisited: A Decade of Promise without Fulfillment, in The Rights of the Accused 177, 184-86 (S. Nagel ed. 1972).

6. 18 U.S.C. § 3147 (1976).

7. See C. Whitebread, Criminal Procedure. 345-46 (1980). Wald. supra note 5,
at 186.
8. See Wald, supra note 5, at 186.
9. See Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of PretrialDetention, 55
Va. L. Rev. 1223, 1223 (1969) (footnote omitted).
10. See Preventive Detention: Hearings Before the Subconmn. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong.. 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Preventive Detention Hearings], W. Thomas, supra note 5. at "-))9-31.
11. A preventive detention provision was incorporated in the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 210ia),
84 Stat. 644 (1970) (codified at D.C. Code Encvcl. § 23-1322 (West Supp. 1970)).
12. See W. Thomas, supra note 5, at 8-10.
13. See Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on S. 1722 and S. 17.3
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10323, 10340.
10350 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1722 and 1723].
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (1976).
15. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (available from the U.S. Government
Printing Office).
16. Id. § 3502. As originally introduced in the Senate, S. 1722 carried forward
the provisions of the Bail Reform Act.
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further action in the Senate. In an article in the Fordharn Law Review, Senator Kennedy, as a sponsor of these provisions, urged their
enactment. 17 The Senator finds only "one important shortcoming" in
the "traditional approach" to bail as a means of assuring an accused's
appearance at trial-its failure "to deal effectively with those defendants who commit crimes while they are free on bail." 18 Section
3502 represents a "new approach," which purports to be a "middle
course" between preventive detention and "release . . . based solely
on the likelihood of flight."1 9 The goals of this new approach are to
confront the problem of pretrial crime, while avoiding the pitfalls of
preventive detention, and to "bring new
candor to the bail release
20
practices."
abusive
ending
by
decision
Although the proposed bail provisions of S. 1722 may be substantially "new," the), are not in the "middle course." Rather, the new
proposal is far to the right of the Nixon administration concept of
preventive detention and poses a greater threat to individual liberty
21
than any preventive detention scheme espoused by John Mitchell.
It is surprising to have such a proposal from Senator Kennedy, one of
the nation's most ardent and eloquent advocates for the poor and the
powerless. The explanation lies, I think, in a failure to appreciate how
the provisions of the bill will function within the reality of the criminal process. Senator Kennedy also overlooks many facets of the problem of pretrial release that should be considered by those concerned
with the plight of the weak and the poor.
I.

PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND SECTION

3502

During the preventive detention debates in the late sixties and
early seventies, proponents promised that pretrial incarceration of
2
"dangerous defendants" would significantly reduce crime rates. 2 Op23
ponents argued that it was unconstitutional and merely a palliative
17. See generally Kennedy, A New Approach to Bail Release: The Proposed Federal Criminal Code and Bail Reform, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 423 (1980).
18. Id.at 423.
19. Id. at 434-35.
20. Id. at 435.
21. See generally Mitchell, supra note 9.
22. See Preventive Detention Hearings, supra note 10, at 271-88 (statement of
Richard Kleindienst). *See generally Hruska, Preventive Detention: The Constitution
and the Congress, 3 Creighton L. Rev. 36 (1969); Mitchell, supra note 9.
23. By prohibiting "excessive bail," the eighth amendment of the United States
Constitution arguably precludes denial of pretrial release for any reason but risk of
flight. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). In any event, preventive detention is
a deprivation of liberty without due process. See Tribe, An Ounce of Detention:
Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 Va. L. Rev. 371 (1970). Equal
protection problems also arise. See Foote, The Coinng Constitutional Crisis in Bail
(pts. 1-2), 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 959, 1125 (1965); cf. Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness
and Mental Illness Some Observations on the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted
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to the crime problem. 2' Most cogently, perhaps, the critics pointed
out that it was virtually impossible to predict dangerousness accurately. Any attempt to do so was certain to lead to over-prediction
and the erroneous jailing of the great majority of detainees. Prevention of one crime might require the incarceration of as many as
twenty persons. 25 Regardless of constitutionality, this would be an
exorbitant and unprecedented price for an insignificant reduction in
the crime rate. Indeed, crime might be more effectively prevented if
the money required for detention hearings, jailing and maintaining
the detainees, as well as supporting their dependents, was allocated
26
to other crime prevention activities.
Senator Kennedy seems to join opponents of preventive detention
in acknowledging that "accurate predictions of a defendant's future
criminality are difficult to make." 2 7 He agrees that pretrial detention
"iscontrary to the presumption of innocence and undermines the accused's constitutional protections," 2 8s and that '[ilt is questionable
whether such complete pretrial incarceration is constitutionally permissible." 29 Citing the experience in the District of Columbia,
by Reason of Insanity, 70 Yale L.J. 225, 237-38 (1960) (the continued detention of a
person who is no longer insane but still potentially dangerous is constitutionally questionable); Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1489, 1499-1500
(1966) (the right to bail is implied but undefined by the eighth amendment). But see
Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 60 Geo. L.J. 1381 (1972); Mitchell,
supra note 9, at 1224-31. See also Wald, supra note 5, at 190-92 (summarizing several other legal issues).
24. Report of the Judicial Council Committee to Study the Operation of the Bail
Reform Act in the District of Columbia (1969) (minority views of Beaudin, Bowers,
Bowman, Freed and Wald), reprinted in Preventive Detention Hearings. supra note
10, at 703, 738-42; Tribe, supra note 23, at 371-74.
25. See Dershowitz, Imprisonment by Judicial Hunch, 57 A.B.A.J. 560. 563
(1971). See generally Dershowitz, Preventive Detention: Social Threat, Trial, DecJan, 1969-70, at 22; Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About
Predictions, 23 J. Legal Educ. 24 (1970); Preventive Detention: An Empirical
Analysis, 6 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 300 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Empirical
Analysis]. Reliable predictors of pretrial crime are unavailable. Sce National Bureau
of Standards Report, Compilation and Use of Criminal Court Data in Relation to
Pre-Trial Release of Defendants (1970), reprinted in Preventive Detention Hearings,
supra note 10, at 765; P. Wice, Freedom For Sale 77-80 (1974).
26. A recent study indicated that it costs approximately 870 per day, almost
$26,000 per year, to confine a prisoner in a New York City jail. N.Y. Times, Mar. 2,
1978, § B, at 7, col. 1.
27. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 430.
28. Id. at 428.
29. Id. at 430. The constitutionality of the District of Columbia preventive detention provisions, D.C. Code Encycl. § 23-1322 (West Supp. 1970), has never been
decided by an appellate court. But see Blunt v. United States, 322 A.2d 579 (D.C.
1974), which upheld its application to a defendant who had repeatedly threatened a
prosecution witness. The court believed that there was ample authority for the detention even without the preventive detention provisions of D.C. Code Encycl. § 231321(a) (West Supp. 1970). See also Carbo v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 662 (Douglas,
Circuit Justice, 1962); United States v. Gilbert, 425 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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where a preventive detention measure has been in effect since 1970,
Senator Kennedy faults that statute on more pragmatic grounds: it
simply has not worked. Prosecutors have not used it 30 because it is
burdensome, time-consuming, and requires expedited trials.
Moreover, it is unnecessary. Judges are willing to circumvent it sub
rosa by imposing high money bail, ostensibly because of the risk of
flight. Thus, preventive detention appears "in disguise without the
need to comply with due process requirements and an expedited trial
date." 31
Senator Kennedy asserts, however, that "the critical problem of
crimes committed by persons on bail cannot be ignored." 3 2 He
states that persons on bail are being arrested and charged with serious felonies with "increasing frequency." Moreover, "the likelihood of
a person committing additional crimes while on bail is not only higher
than the crime rate for the general population, .

.

. it is also much

33
higher than the likelihood of the suspect's failing to appear at trial."
The first claim, that arrests for pretrial crime are increasing in "frequency," is not surprising in view of the growth in population and
34
crime rates, and the woeful failures of our correctional systems.
The second, that the statistical "likelihood" of such crime is "higher
than the crime rate in general," is not new. Persons charged with
crime are, for the most part, members of disadvantaged groupsracial and ethnic minorities, young males, the unemployed, those deficient in skills or education-who account for a disproportionate
share of recorded crime. Members of these groups who are not
charged with crime are also statistically more likely to commit crimes
than the general population. 35 The third contention, that pretrial
crime occurs at a rate "much higher than the likelihood of the suspect's
failing to appear at trial," is puzzling. Although pretrial crime is

30. Preventive detention could have been invoked in 1,500 cases in 1977, but
prosecutors requested it in only 40. See Kennedy, supra note 17, at 430-31. See also
N. Bases & W. McDonald, Preventive Detention in the District of Columbia: The
First Ten Months (1972); Wald, supra note 5, at 193.
31. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 431.
32. Id. at 428.
33. Id.
34. Senator Kennedy's principal source for his statement on the increase in pretrial crime rate is P. Wice, supra note 25, at 73-77. Professor Wice's statistics do not
show that the percentage rate of rearrest while on bail has increased in recent years.
Rather, his report on a 72 city survey found that "half of the cities surveyed experi-

enced an increase in the number of crimes committed by defendants awaiting trial for
another crime." Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
35. See President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 43 (1967) [hereinafter cited as President's Report on Crime]; D.C. Bail Agency, Report for the Period January 1,
1977-December 31, 1977, at 17-20 [hereinafter cited as 1977 D.C. Bail Agency
Report]; C. Silberman, Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice 48-50 (1978); Empirical
Analysis, supra note 25, at 306-07.
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doubtless a more serious problem than nonappearance for trial under
present bail practices, 3 6 Senator Kennedy seems to conclude from
this comparison that there is a "failure of our bail laws to balance the
likelihood of the defendant's appearance at trial wvith the needs of
community safety." 3 7 Assuming Senator Kennedy means that courts
should consider dangerousness as well as risk of flight in bail decisions, the conclusion simply does not follow from the data. Low rates
of nonappearance, either in absolute terms or relative to crime rates,
are simply not relevant to the seriousness of the crime problem or
the need to reform bail decisionmaking to transform it into a crimefighting device." 3 8 Infrequent willful failures of releasees to appear
for trial merely suggest that courts are too stringent in setting release
conditions to assure appearance.
Neither Senator Kennedy's statistics nor his analysis indicates that
the problem of pretrial crime during release has altered signiificantly
since 1970.39 He is undoubtedly correct that the problem "cannot be
36. The study cited by Senator Kennedy, J. Roth & P. Wice, Pretrial Release
and Misconduct in the District of Columbia 11-45 to -59 (Institute for Law & Social
Research, PROMIS Research Project No. 16 1978) [hereinafter cited as Inslaw
Study], showed a willful nonappearance rate in the District of Columbia of 3.5% for
felonies and 2.5% for misdemeanors. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 428 n.38. Another
recent study of a random sample of felony defendants drawn from eight federal districts, thought to represent "a cross section of the federal bail system in terms of
geography, criminal caseload size, and PSA [pretrial service agency] versus non-PSA
districts," found a "failure to appear" rate of 3.4%. General Accounting Office, Statistical Results of the Bail Process in Eight Federal District Courts 1, 27 (1978) [hereinafter cited as GAO Study].
37. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 424.
38. Id. at 430.
39. Some of the more alarming statistics cited by Senator Kennedy, including
40% rearrest rates for larceny and forger., and 33% for robbery. id. at 423-24. art not
new. During the preventive detention debates of 1969-70, there were claims of rearrest rates as high as 70%. See Hruska, supra note 22, at 40; Mitchell, supra note 9,
at 1236. The most serious and reliable studies show a rearrest rate of approximately
10%. See, e.g., P. Wice, supra note 2., at 75 (71 in mnulti-cit' survey); National
Bureau of Standards Report, Compilation and Use of Criminal Court Data in Relation
to Pre-Trial Release of Defendants (1970), reprinted in Pre'entiL', Detention Hearings, supra note 10, at 767 (11% in District of Columbia); Empirical Analysis, supra
note 25, at 308-09 (in Boston, 14.5% released defendants rearrested, of which 64%,
or 9.6% of the total sample, were convicted of offense for which rearrested). A more
recent study found a 13% rearrest and less than 50% conviction rate among persons
charged with felonies in the District of Columbia Superior Court in 1974. Inslaw
Study, supra note 36, at 11-48 to -51. Another recent General Accounting Office
stud), of eight representative federal districts found a rearrest rate of 9%, 25% of
which were misdemeanor charges. GAO Study, supra note 36, at 30-31. Employing
post-release arrests as the measure of crimes on release is problematic. In the District of Columbia, for example, only half those arrests result in convictions, as noted
above. Most of the data on arrests during pretrial release also fail to distinguish
between arrests for pre-release offenses and those for post-release offenses. A postrelease arrest, moreover, is a convenient device for police to "appeal" a release deci-
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ignored," but the issue is what role it should play in bail decisionmaking.40 Senator Kennedy believes the answer is found in the proposed legislation. Section 3502, however, not only sanctions preventive detention, it fails to provide the procedural safeguards found in
the nation's only other preventive detention statute. This may be
demonstrated by a direct comparison of section 3502 with the much
criticized preventive detention provisions of the District of Columbia
Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970. 4 '
A. Section 3502 and the District of Columbia
Preventive Detention Statute: A Comparison
Section 3502 directs the judge to release on his own recognizance
or an unsecured appearance bond, any person whose signature will
"reasonably assure" his appearance for trial. 4 2 Such an accused is to
be released on the condition that he "not commit a federal, [s]tate, or
local crime." 4 3 If more assurance of appearance is required, the
judge may impose "the least restrictive condition or combination" of
eleven conditions of release that will provide that assurance. 44 The
court then determines whether the accused's release "will endanger
the safety of any other person or the community" and may impose
another combination of the same conditions that will reasonably assure community safety. 45 The first ten conditions- third party cuzs-

sion they do not like. Such an arrest is likely to result in pretrial detention, sub rosa
or otherwise. Thus, there may be a relationship between liberal pretrial release and
arrests during release that has nothing to do with pretrial crime.
40. The crime rate among the general population is said to be more than 5%.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Uniform Crime Reports for the United States 35 (1978). It is
doubtful that more than 5% to 10% of the nation's crime is committed by persons on
pretrial release, who at any given time number less than 1% of the population.
Hence, if all persons arrested were incarcerated, the reduction in the crime rate
might be insubstantial. Even with respect to robbery, where recidivism is said to be
very high, it has been estimated that jailing all defendants during the entire pretrial
period would only reduce this crime by about 5%. See W. Thomas, supra note 5, at
238. It has also been established that pretrial crime rates increase as the time between arrest and disposition lengthens. See National Bureau of Standards, Compilation and Use of Criminal Court Data in Relation to Pre-Trial Release of Defendants
(1970), reprinted in Preventive Detention Hearings, supra note 10, at 765, 770; EmapiricalAnalysis, supra note 25, at 299, 389. According to these studies, less than half
the rearrests occurred during a 90 day period following arrest. If the Speedy Trial
Act of 1975, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976), which aims at trying cases within 100
days of the charge, is ever fully implemented, pretrial crime could be halved. See
generally Project, The Speedy Trial Act: An Empirical Study, 47 Fordham L. Rev.
713 (1979).
41. D.C. Code Encycl. § 23-1322 (West Supp. 1970).
42. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(a) (1979).

43. Id. § 3502(c).
44. Id. § 3502(a),(d).
45. Id. § 3502(b),(d).
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tody, restrictions on travel, regular reporting, no contact with witnesses, no firearms, psychiatric treatment, drug or alcohol treatment,
money bail and surety bonds46 -are drawn in large measure from
existing law and practice in the District of Columbia. The District of
Columbia Court Reform and Procedure Act of 1970 did not merely
add preventive detention to the Bail Reform Act, it modified the latter by requiring the judge to select a combination of release conditions not only to assure appearance for trial, the only purpose in all
other federal districts, but to assure community safety'. 47 Accordingly, all of the first ten conditions in section 3502 have been utilized
in the District of Columbia.4 8 What is truly new about section 3502
is condition eleven, which requires that the defendant "return to official detention after specified hours or during specified periods, and
abide by such other severe restrictions on the person's freedom, associations, or activities that the court deems appropriate." 4 9 It is
condition eleven, which, according to Senator Kennedy, makes section 3502 a middle course and, which, according to the Committee,
avoids "the controversies and practical arguments surrounding preventive detention." 50 Although Senator Kennedy states that outright
confinement should be a last resort under section 3502, he acknowledges that it is permissible and that "[h]ow close this provision comes
to actual preventive detention will ultimately depend upon how the
courts use it." 5 1 If conditions of release fail to offer an adequate
assurance of safety, however, section 3502 implicitly mandates denial
of release. There is no difference between preventive detention and
denial of release.
1. Eligibility
The District of Columbia statute provides that, except for one who
injures or intimidates a prospective witness or juror, no one is subject
to a preventive detention hearing unless he is charged with a
"dangerous" or a "violent" crime. 5 2 These concepts are, for the most
46. Id. § 3502(b),(d)(1)-(10).
47. D.C. Code Encycl. §§ 23-1321-1332 (West Supp. 1970).
48. See generally W. Thomas, supra note 5, at 171-79.
49. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(d)(11) (1979).
50. S. Rep. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1078 (1980).
51. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 434. Because condition 11 explicitly authorizes
detention "during specified periods," S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(d)(11)
(1979), it literally authorizes unconditional detention. If there were any ambiguity, it
would be removed by the Committee Report, which states that "[t]here may be rare
cases in which some form of pretrial detention is required" and cites two cases,
United States v. Abrahams, 575 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978)
and People v. Melville, 62 Misc. 2d 366, 308 N.Y.S.2d 671 (Crim. Ct. 1970). in
which detention would be proper. S. Rep. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1078
(1980).
52. D.C. Code Encycl. § 23-1322(a)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1970).
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part, intelligibly defined, 53 though overbroad. 54 If the crime charged
is "violent" but not "dangerous," a defendant is eligible for preventive detention only if he has a prior conviction for such a crime or
was free on bail for a previous charge of a violent crime. 55 It seems
unlikely that more than thirty percent of defendants charged with
federal felonies would even qualify for a hearing 56 under the District
of Columbia statute. Under section 3502, every person accused of
any offense, even a misdemeanor or an "infraction," may be considered a threat
to community safety and have his dangerousness deter57
mined.
2. Triggering Mechanisms
Under the District of Columbia provisions, there can be no hearing
unless the prosecutor requests it 58 and, with respect to one charged
with a "dangerous crime," certifies that there is no other way to as53. "Dangerous crime" includes robbery, burglary, arson, rape, attempts to
commit such crimes, and the distribution of drugs. Id. § 23-1331(3). Violent crime
includes homicide, rape, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, extortion or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, and various other offenses, including, regrettably,
taking "immoral, improper, or indecent liberties with a child under the age of sixteen
years." Id. § 23-1331(4).
54. Professor Tribe points out that "a person convicted of indecent exposure in
1960 and charged with purse-snatching in 1970 is among [Nixon's] 'hard core recidivists.' " Tribe, supra note 23, at 382-83.
55. D.C. Code Encycl. § 23-1322(a)(2) (West Supp. 1970).
56. In a random sample of District of Columbia fblony defendants in 1971, only
67 of 200, or about 33%, apparently met the criteria. N. Bases & W. McDonal
supra note 30, at 61. The Federal Court for the District of Columbia was at that
time, however, a court of general jurisdiction, analogous to a state court."[Only 30
percent of the caseload [was] comparable to that of the federal courts in the other 89
districts." Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Offenders in the United
States District Courts 27 (1970). It is conjectural, therefore, whether the incidence of
charges of "violent" or "dangerous" crimes in the federal courts as a whole is greater
or less than that in the District of Columbia in 1971. In 1978, of the 15,847 criminal
cases pending in all federal district courts, 4,671, or approximately 30% of the total,
were homicides, robberies, assaults, burglaries, or narcotics violations. Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, 1978 Annual Report of the Director 121 [hereinafter cited
as Director's Annual Report]. Some of these cases would not qualify as "dangerous"
crimes, or even "violent" ones, though some of the charges in other categories, such
as "weapons and firearms," might. A large percentage of persons charged with "violent" but not "dangerous" crimes, moreover, do not qualify because they lack the
requisite prior conviction or bail status. See Empirical Analysis, supra note 21, at
306.
57. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(b) (1979). These provisions apply to any
person charged with an offense, which is defined as any violation of the Criminal
Code, including not only misdemeanors, but infractions, offenses for which not more
than five days imprisonment is authorized. Id. § 111. Indeed, because § 3502 is not
limited to persons who are arrested, it even applies to defendants who are simply
summoned to court.
58. D.C. Code Encycl. § 23-1322(c)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1970).
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sure community safety. 59 If no motion for detention has been made,
a judge cannot be faulted for releasing a person without first having
determined his eligibility for preventive detention. Under section
3502, however, a determination of dangerousness is required with
respect to every person "charged with an offense" whom the judge
thinks can reasonably be expected to appear for trial.6 0 Thus, the
judge is open to criticism for every crime committed by one whom he
has released.
3. Procedural Protections
Detention cannot be ordered under the District of Columbia provisions without a hearing held expressly for that purpose, with the accused represented by counsel 6 ' and granted an opportunity to adduce evidence on the issues. 62 Moreover, the ultimate issue of
"safety of the community," although not defined, is surely limited, by
pari materia, to a risk of commission by the defendant of a "dangerous" 63 or "violent" crime,6 or the intimidation of witnesses or
jurors. 6 5 The prosecution has the burden of proof on all issues of
fact, including the risk to community safety and the probability of
defendant's guilt of the crime charged. 66 Proof, although it need
not
67 must
be admissible under the rules of evidence applicable to trials,
be "clear and convincing." 68 If a defendant testifies, his testimony
cannot be used against him "on the issue of guilt in any judicial proceeding." 69 In addition, the judge must make "'written findings of
70
fact and the reasons for [a detention order]."
Although the District of Columbia provision contains serious procedural deficiencies, 71 virtually all its protections and safeguards are
missing from section 3502. the new proposal is "conspicuously silent ' 7 2 on the burden of proof or persuasion, the right to counsel,
the right to adduce evidence, or the use that may be made of the
59. Id. § 23-13 22 (a)(1).
60. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(a)-(b) (1979).
61. D.C. Code Encycl. § 23-1332(c)(4) (West Supp. 1970).
62. The accused is "entitled to present information by proffer or otherwise, to
testify, and to present witnesses in his own behalf." Id. He is also entitled to a
continuance of the hearing for up to five days. Id. § 23-1322c)(4).
63. Id. § 23-1331(3).
64. Id. § 23-1331(4).
65. Id. § 23-1322(a)(3). But see note 113 infra.
66. See Mitchell, supra note 9, at 1238.
67. D.C. Code Encycl. § 23-1322(c)(5 (West Supp. 1970).

68. Id. § 23-1322(b)(2).
69. Id. § 23-1322(c)(6). This testimony may be used, however, in perjury proceedings and for impeachment purposes. Id.

70. Id. § 23-1322(b)(3).
71. See generally Tribe, supra note 23.
72. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 434.
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defendant's testimony. The key concept, "endanger the sfety of any
other person or the community," 73 is not defined. Section 3502
seems to anticipate that the defendant's threat to the "safety of the
community" will routinely be decided as part of the normal bail determination.7" An accused may therefore find himself labelled a risk
to community safety without realizing the question was in issue75 and
before he has counsel. 76 The entire section contains only two references to a hearing procedure. First, "[a]ny information may be presented . . . regardless of its admissibility." 77 Second, the judge, "on
the basis of available information," must "take into account (1) the
nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the
evidence against the person; and (3) the history and characteristics of
the person. "78 A judge, acting on the presumption that all persons
73. See S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3502-3510 (1979).
74. See also notes 131-35 infra and accompanying text.
75. Cf. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976) (notice of the true nature
of the charges is the first requirement of due process); Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S.
347, 350 (1964) (criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct it proscribes).
76. Counsel is usually appointed to represent a defendant after the defendant's
first appearance, where bail will normally have been set. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 122 (1975), which held that there is no constitutional right to counsel at
probable cause hearings. Once he has counsel, a defendant may, of course, move for
reconsideration of the bail terms, S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(g) (1979), but
he then encounters the usual obstacles involved in convincing a judge to change his
mind or overrule a magistrate. See P. Wice, supra note 25, at 48. The constitutional
right to assistance of counsel has been cast into doubt by the Court's decision in Scott
v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). The Court purported to hold that regardless of the
sentence actually authorized upon conviction, "the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him
the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense." Id. at 373-74 (emphasis
added). In the unlikely event that the Court meant what it said in Scott, an indigent
defendant could be denied counsel throughout the entire proceedings, even in a
felony prosecution, provided he is not "sentenced" to jail. His pretrial incarceration
could then become his punishment. I have argued, on the contrary, that any criminal
charge, however petty, invokes the constitutional right to appointed counsel if the
defendant is subject to being jailed, as a pretrial detainee or as part of a sentence.
Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 601, 613-14 (1975). Even if he has counsel and notice that dangerousness is in
issue, the defendant is denied the right to confront witnesses against him. See S.
1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(i) (1979). His dangerousness will also be determined under § 3502 without ascertainable standards for decision, Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966), without written findings of fact, and without meaningful
appellate review. Such a procedure would not support the deprivation of a driver's
license, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), or welfare benefits, Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970). It would not warrant the replevy of a television set from a
delinquent buyer. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See also Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (refusal to rehire university teacher); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973) (probation violation).
77. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(i) (1979).
78. Id. § 3502(e)..
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charged with serious crimes are dangers to community safety, could
cast the burden on the accused to prove otherwise. The accused
would be in a position to offer little more than plaintive assurances of
his good character and intentions. The judge would certainly be entitled to disbelieve these assertions, and his disbelief would never be
proven wrong if the defendant was incarcerated. 7 9
4. Time Limits
A person cannot be jailed on the basis of risk to the community
safety under the District of Columbia provisions for more than sixty'
days. 8 0 There is no time limitation under section 3502.81 Whatever
bail conditions are imposed will continue, unless modified, until the
disposition of the defendant's case. Aperson could, therefore, be detained under section 3502 for a period longer than that for which he
could be imprisoned if convicted of the offense charged. 82
5. Appellate Review
Both the District of Columbia statute 83 and section 3502 8 provide
for appellate review on behalf of one who is detained. They also require affirmance if the order "is supported by the proceedings below.'"85 Inasmuch as section 3502 places no restrictions on evidence,
requires no evidentiary hearing or written findings of fact, and does
not define the criteria of dangerousness, 8 6 it is unclear how any order
could be found procedurally defective. Moreover, given the acknowledgement in Senator Kennedy's article 8 7 and in the Committee Report 88 that predicting dangerousness is a difficult and speculative undertaking, it is unlikely that any appellate court would demand concrete evidence of dangerousness. 89 Under section 3502, the district
court is probably insulated from review if it explicitly grounds its find79. The only visible failure of this system is that pretrial crimes may be committed on release. See Tribe, supra note 23, at 375.
80. D.C. Code Encycl. § 23-1322(d)(2) (West Supp. 1970).
81. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502 (1979). The bill provides that a defendant subjected "'to severe restrictions" under condition 11, -shall be brought to trial
expeditiously pursuant to the [Speedy Trial Act]." Id. § 3502(d)11). This is redundant.
82. Cf. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 24041 (1970) (unconstitutional to jail a
defendant to "work off" fines beyond the period of authorized sentence).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 3147(a) (1976).
84. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3506 (1979).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 3147(b) (1976); S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3506(b) (1979).
86. See notes 72-79 supra and accompanying text.
87. See Kennedy, supra note 17, at 428.
88. S. Rep. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1077-78 (1980).
89. To require real proof of dangerousness, when such proof is rarely available,
would condemn the crime prevention aspects of § 3502 to instant desuetude.
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ing of dangerousness on one or more of the three factors that it is told
to consider, 90 and specifically finds that only denial of release will
"assure the safety of. . . the community."91 Indeed, short of a finding of unconstitutionality, it is hard to 'imagine a situation in which an
appellate court would ever reverse a finding of dangerousness under
section 3502.
The statutory promise of prompt appellate review does not guarantee that it will be available. The prompt appellate review provided
under the Bail Refbrm Act of 1966, for example, is virtually nonexistent. 92 Despite long experience with predicting likelihood of flight,
appellate courts are unwilling to reverse district judges who set sub
rosa preventive detention bonds. This is true even though the only
legitimate risk is an erroneous prediction of appearance, which is
minimal in most cases. 93 These are the same courts that will review
detention orders under section 3502. An appellate court is unlikely to
second-guess a district judge for failure to impose one or more of the
ten conditions that precede the preventive detention provision, when
almost nothing is known of their efficacy in curbing crime. 94 A reversal under section 3502 would involve assuming not only the responsibility of nonappearance but also the responsibility for pretrial
crime. Relief from such responsibilities is one of the attractions of
elevation to an appellate court, and will not be surrendered easily.
It is thus clear that, rather than being a "middle course," section
3502 gives the courts something approaching carte blanche to imprison anyone charged with any offense if they think he is dangerous.
Of course, it does not require such detention, but then neither does
the District of Columbia scheme. Section 3502, unlike the District of
Columbia statute, also requires the judge to impose conditions that
will assure community safety in every case brought before him. 95
Furthermore, section 3502 may deprive the defendant of personal
liberties without the procedural safeguards afforded by the District of
Columbia statute. In addition, section 3502 contains another unique
provision that carries a sizeable potential for abuse.
90. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(e) (1979).

91. Id. § 3502(b).
92. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
93. See W. Thomas. supra note 5, at 87-105 (noting difficulties in evaluating the
data); note 36 supra.
94. S. Rep. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1077-78 (1980).
95. See notes 52-57 supra and accompanying text. In form, the non-preventive
detention provisions in the District of Columbia also require the judge routinely to
set such conditions as will provide that assurance. D.C. Code Encycl. § 23-1321(a)
(West Supp. 1970). He is denied authority to impose financial conditions for that
purpose, however, and may only incarcerate a defendant for specified hours. Id,The
burden placed upon the judge is so contradictory, therefore, that it is all but meaningless. Moreover, the presence of an elaborate preventive detention scheme arguably precludes a judge in the District of Columbia from legitimately considering
community safety in the normal course.
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B. The Mandatory Condition

The mandatory condition of section 3502 requires that everyone
charged with an offense, who is released, shall be released on the
"'explicit . . . condition . . . that the person not commit a federal,
[sitate or local crime during the period of his release." 96 Violation of
this condition can result in revocation of bail and confinement of the
accused.9 7 Although Senator Kennedy considers this provision as
perhaps "the most important" release condition, 98 he does not explain
how pretrial detention for violation of a condition as broad as section
3502(c) is constitutionally permissible. 9 9 The only plausible theory is
that a defendant, having been warned of the consequences of a condition violation, willfully "forfeits" or "waives" his right to pretrial liberty by the subsequent misconduct. 10 0 Yet, the theory of "waiver"
or forfeiture" in this context cannot rationally rest on such a vague
and overinclusive prohibition. 1 1 The mandatory condition of section
3502(c) applies to a "crime," but a crime, as defined by S. 17-2,
includes an offense for which a term of imprisonment of more than
five days is authorized.' 0 2 If a person released on bail commits a
local traffic offense for which he could theoretically receive in excess
of five days in jail, he has violated the mandatory release condition.
His bail may be revoked during the entire period from revocation to
disposition of the original charge, regardless of its length.' 0 3 To con96. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(c) (1979).
97. Id.§ 3507(b).
98. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 433.
99. The Committee cites State v. Cassius, 110 Ariz. 485, 520 P.2d 1109 (1974)
(en bane), cert. dismissed, 420 U.S. 514 (1975) (per curiam), for the proposition that
"it is permissible to condition pretrial release by a requirement that the defendant
conduct himself as a law-abiding citizen." S. Rep. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
1075 n.19 (1980). The case, however, merely affirms the obvious right of the state to
declare and punish, as a crime, in a criminal proceeding, the commission of a felony
during pretrial release. The broadness of the mandatory condition is suspect. In Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15 (1967) (per curiam), the trial judge had revoked the
defendant's bail because he was 37 minutes late to court. The Court reversed his
conviction on the charges for which he had been on trial, saying "'thetrial judge's
order of commitment .. .had the appearance and effect of punishment....
Punishment may not be so inflicted." Id. at 17.
100. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) C'waiver" of right to be present at
one's own trial); Hall, Subsequent Misconduct as Groundfor Forfeiture of the Right
to Release on Bail-A Proposal, 15 N.Y.L.F. 873 (1969).
101. See Empirical Analysis, supra note 205, at 365-67. On the generally murk)'
question of waiver and forfeiture, see Saltzburg, Pleas of Guilty and the Loss of
ConstitutionalRights: The Current Price of Pleading Guilty, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 1265
(1978); Westen, Forfeiture by Guilty Plea-A Reply, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 1308 (1978).
102. S.1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 111 (1979).
103. Id. § 3507. This provision is also inconsistent .vith another provision, which
authorizes the court to "dispose of an offense that is a misdemeanor or an infraction"
by declaring a forfeiture of collateral. Id. § 3502(k). Section 3502(c) is an invitation to
political repression. The authorities might easily confine a person to jail for several
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dition release on a prohibition of any "federal, [s]tate or local crime"
is illogical. The commission of a great many "crimes" is a matter of
little public concern and no federal concern, and has nothing to do
with the defendant's likelihood of appearance or danger to community "safety."
It has been argued that confinement for a violation of the mandatory condition is not the functional equivalent of preventive detention
because the defendant is being denied his liberty not on a prediction
of future criminal behavior, but on the allegation of criminal behavior
during the release period. 10 4 On close examination, the distinction
blurs. Under the District of Columbia preventive detention provisions, a person is confined because of two factors: (1) what he is believed to have done, commission of a violent or dangerous crime or
intimidating witnesses, and (2) a prediction that he would be dangerous if released. Under section 3502(c), a defendant would be confined
for what he is believed to have done, violated the mandatory condition by commission of a "crime," and for what he is predicted to do
in the future, fail to appear for trial, endanger community safety, or
further violate conditions.' 0 5
II.

THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF SECTION

3502

Senator Kennedy believes that legitimating considerations of community safety will have beneficial effects throughout the bail system. 10 6 I think that he is clearly mistaken, and that, on the contrary,
his proposal will produce more "hypocrisy" and more sub rosa bail
decisions without any offsetting improvements.
A. Judicial Burdens
One effect of the proposal can be safely predicted. Pretrial incarceration will significantly increase. Judges, at present, are subjected
to inordinate pressure from the press, the public, the police, and the
months by first charging him with some offense, following this with pretrial release,
and then by a misdemeanor charge. For a discussion of numerous instances in which
bail has been used for similar purposes, including a $25,000 bond for driving without
a license, see R. Goldfarb, Ransom: A Critique of the American Bail System 49-81

(1965).
104. See Empirical Analysis, supra note 25, at 367.
105. The proposed legislation directs the judge, upon a finding of a violation of the
mandatory condition, to revoke bail and confine the accused unless he is assured that
the accused will appear for trial, will not endanger community safety, and will not
violate the mandatory condition again. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3507(b)
(1979). Thus, even if the accused is a perfect bail risk and offers no risk to community
safety, he is to be confined if he might again commit a federal, state, or loca crime.
Id. It is virtually impossible for anyone to avoid committing minor offenses and thus
impossible to provide the necessary assurance that will preclude incarceration.
106. See generally Kennedy, supra note 17.
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prosecutors to keep persons arrested for serious charges in jail.10 7 As
a result, many judges routinely flout their oaths of office, blink at the
Bail Reform Act and the eighth amendment, and impose unrealistic
money bail requirements.10 The same judges, under even increased
pressure, will administer section 3502. If this proposal is enacted,
they will have been conscripted by Congress into "crime-fighting" 109
and given the responsibility of assuring community safety in every
case presented to them. Under the Bail Reform Act, a judge who is
criticized for releasing a person pending trial can contend that he was
fulfilling his duties. 110 The procedural safeguards of the District of
Columbia preventive detention model protect not only the defendant
but the judge by buffering his decisionmaking from pressures. All this
is stripped away under section 3502, leaving the judge alone, unprotected, unfettered, and unguided."' Section 3502 could conceivably
reduce "abusive practices," 1 12 but its success would hinge on the
elimination of standards and criteria by which a practice may be
evaluated. It is indeed difficult to think of an abuse under section
3502 in terms of willful disregard of clear statutory commands, for
107. The tribulations of Judge Bruce McM. Wright anply illustrate this pressure.
Dubbed "Turn 'Em Loose Bruce" bv the police for his liberal bail decisions as a
Criminal Court Judge, Judge Wright even had the Mayor of New York City publicly condemn one of his decisions as "bizarre." See N.Y. Times. Apr. 22, 1979, § 4,
at 6E, col. 3; id. Apr. 18, 1979, § B, at 1, col. 6; id. Apr. 17. 1979. § B, at 3. cl. 6;
id. Apr. 16, 1979, § B, at 1, col. 6; id. Apr. 14, 1979. § A. at 1. col. 1; id. Apr. 13,
1979, § A, at 1, col. 2.
108. See Kennedy, supra note 17. at 428. Thissub rosa practice has often been acknowledged. See, e.g., United States v. Melville, 306 F. Supp. 124, 126-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
W. Thomas, supra note 5. at 246: P. \\ice, supra note 25. at 2-3. A similar argument was urged as justification for preventive detention during the 1969-70 debates,
see Hruska, supra note 22, at 38-39, and noted as such during enactment of the
preventive detention provisions in the District of Columbia. See H.R. Rep. No. 907,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1970). Recognition of the practice long preceded the 1969-70
debates. See President's Report on Crime, supra note 35, at 131; D. Freed and P.
Wald, supra note 2, at 53; Foote, supra note 2, at 1039. Indeed, it was implicit in
Beeley's study. See A. Beelev, The Bail System in Chicago 154-56, 160 (1927).
Senator Kennedy offers no authority indicating that sub rosa preventive detention is
on the increase. Insofar as that might be sensed in the District of Columbia, one
cannot infer any parallels in the 89 other districts, since the practice in the District of
Columbia is not as plainly illegitimate as it is in other districts. As noted earlier, the
judge in the District of Columbia is authorized to "'consider" communits safety in
every bail decision. See notes 47-48 suipra and accompanying text. Moreover, lurking
in the background of bail decisionmaking in the District of Columbia is the possibility
of a detention hearing. This surely puts a damper on a defendant's ssillingness aumd
ability to contest the amount and conditions of money bail, a deterrent not present in
other districts though there are, to be sure, man\ other deterrents in -all districts.
See note 173 infra and accompanying text.
109. See Kennedy, supra note 17. at 430.
110. See United States v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiaui).
111. See pt. I supra.
112. See Kennedy, supra note 17, at 435.
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there are few. On the other hand, the abuse of fundamental ideals
regarding the judicial function and the treatment of presumed innocent defendants would be extreme.
The judge may be unconfined by criteria in section 3502, but he is
by no means free. He has a duty to make responsible decisions. 113
Everyone cannot be locked up; the judge must differentiate among
defendants. Section 3502 offers no assistance in making distinctions
on procedural grounds, 114 determining who is dangerous, or even deciding what dangerous means. 115 Senator Kennedy and the Committee hope, however, that the judge will make "inventive" use of the
other ten release conditions to protect community safety, and use
confinement only as a last resort. 1 1 6 The availability of these conditions 117 offers little protection against excessive incarcerations.
Section 3502 dictates that the choice of release conditions assure
community safety but provides only a few that have any substantial
relationship to curbing pretrial crime. The community peril posed by
a defendant who becomes violent when drunk might be minimized if
he were compelled to undergo treatment for alcoholism. 1 18 An accused with a severe psychiatric problem that manifests itself in violence might be rendered relatively docile if subjected to psychotropic
drug therapy."19 Some defendants might be less apt to commit
crimes if subject to extensive supervision or committed to the custody

113. See generally Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L.
Rev. 353 (1978); Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 Colum. L. Rev.
671 (1980).
114. See notes 71-79 supra and accompanying text.
115. During the preventive detention debates, Associate Deputy Attorney General
Donald Santarelli argued that "danger to the community" was broader than risk of a
violent or dangerous crime, and could include not only a risk of petty theft but of
any crime. Preventive Detention Hearings, supra note 10, at 91, 95. Senator Kennedy notes that § 3502 is "conspicuously silent" regarding the "prerequisites" of
"'preventive detention," as if that were a virtue of his proposal. Kennedy, supra note
17, at 434. Nowhere in his article does he suggest what the phrases "endanger the
safety of any other person or the community" or "assure the safety . . ." mean. S.

1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(b) (1979). Nor does the Committee report cast any
light on this question. S. Rep. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1072-82 (1980). Presumably, but not ineluctably, that concept would mean the same thing it means in
the D.C. Code, see D.C. Code Encycl. § 23-1322(a)(1) (West Supp. 1970), but that
meaning has never been clarified due to the absence of appellate decisions. Of
course, the concept is not entirely new and is presently applicable to bail on appeal,
but there are few decisions on the point. See 8B J. Moore, Federal Practice 46.1012]
(2d ed. 1980).
116. See S. Rep. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1075-78 (1980); Kennedy, supra
note 17, at 433-35.
117. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(d) (1979).
118. Id. § 3502(d)(8).
119. Id.
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of a social service agency. 120 These services, however, are seldom
available and are not created by the proposed statute. Moreover,
treatment is practical only when related to specific propensities, and
someone makes arrangements with the relevant institution. These
services also require a well-staffed, well-financed bail or pretrial ser121
vice agency, which does not exist in the federal system.
Even assuming provision for adequate related services, the judge
122
must still determine who, among the sea of criminal defendants,
have dangerous propensities that are directly related and confined to
drug or alcohol abuse, or controllable mental illness. He must then
decide which of those defendants are likely to respond promptly and
affirmatively to the treatment conditions. these inquiries are guzzlers
of judicial time, ultimately speculative, and not germane to the t"pical accused.
The availability of self-administered conditions provided by section
3502, such as refraining from "excessive use" of alcohol,'2 unprescribed controlled drugs, 124 possession of dangerous veapons, 125 and
contact with witnesses,1 26 do not assist the judge in determining who
must be confined in the name of community safety. These conditions
must be widely and routinely imposed to have any significant effect
on the crime rates, but if they are widely imposed, no pretrial service
or bail agency would ever have the resources to supervise them, and
no district court would have the time to entertain and act upon the
violation notices. Moreover, a defendant who is truly dangerous is not
likely to comply with any such conditions. By making such conditions
of release available to the court and asking it to devise some "combination" to assure community safety, section 3502 will not affect the
ultimate treatment accorded most defendants. In the face of the
court's prediction of real dangerousness, a poised proclivity for violent
crime, the defendant who would be kept in jail through a prohibitive
bond under present sub rosa practices will remain in jail.
If judges are required to consider the safety of the community in
their bail decisionmaking under the provisions of section 3502, they
120. Id. § 3502(d)(1). As Senator Kennedy notes, however, a recent study by the
D.C. Bail Agency calls into doubt the assumption that increased supervision will
reduce pretrial crime. D.C. Bail Agency, How Does Pretrial Supervision Affect Pre-trial
Performance? 19 (1978); see Kennedy, supra note 17, at 423-24 nn.6 & 7.
121. The District of Columbia Pretrial Services Agency (formerly, D.C. Bail
Agency) is, by all accounts, an excellent agency with a comprehensive mandate, but
it is constantly hampered by lack of funds. See, e.g.. 1977 D.C. Bail Agency Report,
sura note 35, at 11, 13, 27. Congress has authorized pretrial service agencies in 10
oter districts. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-3155 (1976).
122. There are about 55,000 defendants entering the federal criminal process annually. GAO Study, supra note 36, at i.
123. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(d)(5) (1979).
124. Id.

125. Id. § 3502(d)(7).
126. Id. § 3502(d)(6).
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will be demoralized and impossibly overburdened. More persons
charged with crime will be confined prior to trial. Gross disparities
and inequalities in the treatment of defendants will result fiom chaotic, lawless decisionmaking based on the prediction of dangerousness.
Defendants, their friends, and their families will justifiably resent the
legal system. Finally, the judicial system will be subjected to ridicule
for failing to perform an impossible task. There is, however, an escape from the dilemma that section 3502 poses, an escape most
judges would quickly locate and employ. They can simply increase
their reliance upon money bail.
B. Dubious Benefits
Senator Kennedy thinks his proposal will eliminate the "abusive
practice" of sub rosa preventive detention achieved through high
money bail ' 27 because the proposal dictates "a two-step analysis" 128
under which the judge first determines the appropriate conditions of
release necessary to assure appearance at trial, and then, "[a]fter .. .
the person has indicated that he can satisfy those conditions," considers the safety of the community and imposes conditions appropriate
to that risk. 1 29 Financial conditions may not be used in the second
3 This "two-step analysis" is the cornerstone of
stage of the analysis. ,i
Senator Kennedy's argument.' 3 1 Upon examination, however, it
crumbles.
Although section 3502 states that the judge shall first order release
of the defendant based upon considerations of flight and then consider dangerousness if the defendant indicates he can satisfy the first
conditions,' 32 busy, judges cannot be expected to construe these provisions as requiring a bifurcated bail hearing. Nothing in the bill purports to mandate two hearings or two discrete stages of the same
hearing with the determinations based solely on the evidence adduced at that stage.' 3 3 The court will consider identical evidence in
determining risk of nonappearance and endangerment of community
safety. 134 Moreover, the factors that may be used to determine
dangerousness may also be used to determine the risk of nonappear-

127. See Kennedy, supra note 17, at 435.
128. Id. at 431.
129. S. 1722, 96th Cong., ist Sess. § 3502(a)(b) (1979).
130. Id. § 3502(b).
131. See Kennedy, upra note 17, at 431-32.
132. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(a)-(b) (1979).
133. This is not to say that the judge may not order a second hearing and receive
more evidence of dangerousness. See S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(h) (1979),
which permits modification of conditions of release "at any time."
134. Id. § 3502(e)(3).
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ance. 13 5 The evidence will therefore appear in one, unsegregated
mass. Based upon such evidence, or lack thereof, the judge will be
free to avoid deciding "community safety," with all its burdens and
complexities, by exhibiting an intense concern over the likelihood of
flight. 136 If he has a glimmer of doubt about the defendant's dangerof "comous propensities, he may neatly sidestep the thorny thicket
137 The judge
bail.
money
prohibitive
set
simply
and
safety"
munity
who imposes exorbitant money bail requirements need not explicitly
consider or make findings on the safety of the community. Indeed, he
is not authorized to consider such factors until and unless he has first
set conditions, which the accused "has indicated . . . he can

135. Such indicators include "history and characteristics of the person, including
his character, mental condition, family, ties, employment, past conduct, length of
residence in the community, [and] financial resources ...." Id. § 3502(eX3).
136. The burdens include not only determining questions of "community safety," a
task that is not within traditional judicial functions, particularly as that question is
posed by § 3502, see notes 113-15 supra and accompanying text, but when the judge
explicitly undertakes to "determine" that question, he relinquishes considerable control over the course of the proceedings and their outcome. The judge has a great deal
at stake, he can be "proven wrong" by a release decision and caustically criticized for
it. See note 107 supra. He may" wish to direct the flow of "'information" to provide
the desired resolution. A judge also knows that bringing the issue of "dangerousness"
to the fore may produce an emotionally freighted, ugly affair, with unpredictable
outbursts, unexpected evidence, and plaintive pleadings, matters which the judge
cannot comfortably confine, control, or publically "evaluate." The weight of the evidence may restrict his ability to follow what external pressure suggests is the right
course. By ostensibly confining the inquiry to risk of appearance, the judge can more
easily build the appropriate record and control the time spent on the issue. In reaching his sub rosa decision, he can rely heavily on quasi-statisticad methods. See gencrally Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment. 88 Yale L.J. 1408 (1979).
137. Senator Kennedy concedes that if community safety "factors were considered
at the time of the initial bail decision, it would constitute preventive detention."
Kennedy, supra note 17, at 433. Yet, this prohibition ultimately represents an attempt to legislate the order in which a judge thinks. It is doubtful that Congress has
any, more control over that matter than law professors. To produce the preventive
detention in disguise, a judge need not impose shockingly high bail bonds. Most
defendants are able to post only very small amounts of money or surety bonds. In a
1957 New York study, 28% of all def'endants could not make $500 bail and 63% could
not make bail at $2,500. Note, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York
City, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 693, 707 (1958). Other studies have produced similar resuits. See Introduction, A.B.A. Standards Relating to Pretrial Release (Approved
Draft, 1968). Under § 3502, the judge and the prosecutor can also exert great influence over the defendant's wvillingness to post a bond, by implicitly threatening to
move to the "second stage of the analysis" if he does so. S. 17"22, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 3502(b) (1979). If the defendant posts a surety bond, then, a &% or two later,
a "modification" hearing is held and the defendant is ordered confined, the defendant
may lose the bond premium. Thus, even a defendant who is able to post the bond
may' decide against it if there is a veiled threat to consider community safety at a
subsequent date.
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satisfy," 138 to assure appearance at trial. Ironically, therefore, section
3502 will not infuse "refreshing candor" 139 into bail decisionmaking.
Rather, it will, by legitimating considerations of dangerousness, sim40
ply encourage further abuse of monetary conditions.'
Senator Kennedy's contention that open consideration of commun-

ity safety will produce less hypocrisy in bail decisionmaking is not a
new one. Precisely the same claim was made by the Nixon administration in support of its preventive detention plan. 14 ' Enactment in
the District of Columbia, however, apparently had the opposite effect, 142 as would enactment of section 3502. IfI am wrong, however,
it is only because judges will substitute confinement for prohibitive
money bail. It is hard to see what has been gained.
It could be claimed that, by legitimating considerations of sa'ety and
inviting candor in the proceedings, different kinds of evidence might
be proferred in the bail hearing, thus making determinations of
dangerousness more rational and reliable. There is, however, little
reason for such a hope. Open discussion and free exchange of views
on a subject that has concerned all societies, but about which little is
known, will have minimal effect on the reliability of the ultimate de43
cision. '

138. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(a) (1979).
139. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 432.
140. Although conceding that § 3502(a) provides that the judge can impose any
financial condition to "assure appearance" that he can under current law, Senator
Kennedy seems to argue that this discretion is somehow more limited under
§ 3502(a) than under the Bail Reform Act. He finds a priority for nonfinancial conditions implied in two features of § 3502: (1) the judge is directed to impose the "least
restrictive" condition, and (2) the financial conditions are numbered (9) and (10) in
subsection (d), being preceded by eight non-financial conditions. Kennedy, su pra
note 17, at 432 n.62. Arguably, however, a financial condition is less "restrictive"
than any, of the conditions which precede it in § 3502. Moreover, if the numbering of
conditions was intended to specif, their priorities, as in the Bail Reform Act, the bill
would plainly have said so. Senator Kennedy, seems to regard this as an inadvertent
error in drafting. Id. at 434-35 n.83. It is, however, most unlikely, for example, that
§ 3502 contemplates that the court, require a defendant, in the ordinary case, to
"undergo available medical or psychiatric treatment, including treatment for drug or
alcohol dependency, and remain in a specified institution if required for that purpose," S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3502(d)(8) (1979), in preference to money bail,
yet that is implicit in the argument.
141. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
142. See Kenned', supra note 17, at 430-31.
143. See N. Morris, The Future of Imprisonment 62-73 (1974); A. Von Hirsch,
Doing Justice 19-26 (1976), authorities cited in Underwood, supra note 136, at 141013. Implicit in the assumption that an open, candid hearing on the issue of dangerousness might improve the reliability of the decision is the premise that clinical
methods are more reliable than statistical methods of prediction in this area, since
the judge will normally rely on rough statistical notions in the absence of such a
candid hearing. The validity of the assumption of clinical superiority, however, is
disputed. Underwood, supra note 136, at 1420-29.
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Furthermore, there is nothing in the proposal that promises that
any different evidence of a defendant's dangerousness would be forthcoming when a judge is specifically directed to consider communihsafety. 144 The prosecutor's case is not strengthened, for he is free to
offer the same evidence to prove likelihood of flight.1 45 It is conceivable, however, that if a defendant knows his dangerousness is in issue, he might put a different light on the prosecutor's evidence, and
one who might otherwise be determined to be dangerous could be
released from custody. Yet, if the free flow of information was a goal
of the Senator's proposal, it would have to be augmented by protections at least as generous as those in the District of Columbia
model. 1 46 Moreover, any serious effort to encourage defendants to
present their side of the dangerousness issue would certainly require
immunizing the defendant's testimony, and probably any information
14 7
offered on his behalf, against subsequent use by the prosecution.
Section 3502 offers no such protection. Rather, it promises the defendant that if he should have the temerity to offer any evidence on the
148
issue, it will be used against him.
Assuming, however, that despite minimal procedural protections or
guidelines, 14 9 a defendant could persuade a judge that he is not
dangerous, it does not follow that the judge's decision would be correct. Furthermore, the possibility that reliability would be enhanced
by the defendant's opportunity to meet the issue of dangerousness is
surely outweighed, or will seem to be outweighed, by the time
wasted in hearing allegedly dangerous defendants attempt to rebut
the prosecutor's evidence.
It is unlikely that the accused will acquire an enhanced respect for
the judicial process by virtue of its candor. A person against whom a
prohibitive money bond is set will either understand its sub rosa significance or feel that he is a victim of discrimination because of his
poverty. If he believes that the only thing preventing his release is a
lack of money, however, his attorney or more seasoned inmates of the
jail will correct this error. The hypocrisy that the defendant perceives
144. See notes 133-36 supra and accompanying text.
145. The illegitimacy of considerations of community safety has not prevented
prosecutors from making available to the court relevant claims or evidence. After all,
any evidence of defendant's "character and mental condition," as well as "his record
of convictions" and "the nature and circumstances of the offense charged" are
explicitly made relevant under the Bail Reform Act to the release decision. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3146(b) (1976).
146. See notes 6-79 supra and accompanying text.
147. Cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (a defendant's testimony in support of a motion to suppress evidence is not admissible at trial on the
issue of guilt). See also 8B J. Moore, Federal Practice ' 46.06 t2d ed. 1980).
148. See S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502 (1979).
149. The defendant may have no advance notice that dangerousness is in issue, no
criteria for the determination of dangerousness, and he may also lack the effective
assistance of counsel. See notes 71-79 supra and accompanying text.
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in the bail process will by no means be his last exposure to that
quality in the criminal process, and may even help prepare him for
what is to come. 150
An accused who is explicitly found to be dangerous and jailed for
that reason acquires a set of resentments that surely exceed those
produced by a sub rosa bail decision. He has been officially labelled
"dangerous" and denied the opportunity to disprove the prediction.' 5 ' He will feel that he has been punished not for what he has
done, but for what a judge predicts he might do if released. Although
there is a punitive-predictive element in every decision that imposes
bail conditions, even if honestly based upon risk of nonappearance,
the stigma associated with being perceived as a possible absconder is
more subtle and evanescent, not only because it is a less serious matter, but because it is more widely shared and diffuse. Being labelled
"dangerous" is also likely to prejudice the defendant in the determination of guilt or in sentencing. It is virtually a prejudgment of his
case, and the conviction 152 and sentence that follow will seem to
him, with some justification, to be a ratification.
C. Balancing the Equation
1. The Community Versus the Defendant
Senator Kennedy's basic justification for authorizing detention
based upon predicted dangerousness is his belief that the Bail Reform
Act fails "to protect the interests of both the community and the accused." 153 Section 3502 "attempts to balance this equation." 154 His

150. The criminal process is hypocritical from beginning to end. See J. Casper,
American Criminal Justice: The Defendant's Perspective (1972); Alschuler, Review of
Silbennan, Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1007, 1019-41
(1979); Blumberg, The Practiceof Law as a Confidence Game: OrganizationalCooptation of a Profession, 1 Law & Soc'y Rev. 15 (1967). See also Vera Institute of Justice,
Felony Arrests: Their Prosecution and Disposition in New York City's Courts (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Felony Arrests].
151. See Underwood, supra note 136.
152. Efforts to prevent a jury from knowing a defendant is incarcerated are frequently unsuccessful. In a highly publicized case, the jury may know both the fact of
and the reason for the incarceration. See Wald, supra note 5, at 194. Moreover, the
vast majority of convictions are obtained on guilty pleas or bench trials in which
everyone knows the defendant's pretrial status.
153. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 435.
154. Id. "If one accepts the premise that the rights of the community should also
be included in the bail decision, it logically follows that once a defendant has been
ordered released on bail, similar conditions should be readily available to protect the
community." Id. at 433. This statement implies that pretrial release is a gift to the
accused for which society should exact a quid pro quo of restricting his freedom to
assure community safety.
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premise is plainly false. The Bail Reform Act itself reflects a heavy
sacrifice of the interests of the accused in favor of the interests of the
community. Ostensibly to assure the presence of the accused at trial,
the present system not only permits a person to be jailed without a
determination of guilt, 155 it permits him to be treated as if he had
been convicted of a crime. 156 Moreover, every study of the matter
has indicated that an accused who is kept in jail pending trial suffers
in the ultimate outcome of the case. He is more frequently convicted
than one released; when convicted, he is more often sentenced to jail
or to prison; when sentenced, he even gets a longer jail or prison
term. 15 7 Despite these disadvantages, many defendants who are
jailed pending trial-one in four in some places-are never convicted. 158 In the interests of assuring his presence at trial, he has
155. In Bell v. Wolfish. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). the Court said that "under the Due
Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in
accordance with due process of law." Id. at 535. Because both parties conceded that
pretrial detention for purposes of assuring appearance for trial wats not "punishment,"
the court did not reach the question of "pretrial detention." id. at 534 n. 15. but
proceeded to hold that such things as unannounced room searches, searches of body
cavities, "double-bunking," and other deprivations were constitutional. Id. at 543,
557, 560. On whether preventive detention is punishment under the Constitution,
see Tribe, supra note 23, at 379. Cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 t19 7 0) (constitutional safeguards are required at the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is
charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult); Bitter v.
United States, 389 U.S. 15, 17 (1967) (per curium) (a pretrial detention order appeared to be punishment when not "designed solely to facilitate the trial"). On the
issue conceded by the parties in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 n.15 (1979), see
Thaler, Punishing the Innocent: The Need for Due Process and the Prevumption of
Innocence Prior to Trial, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 441, 452-54.
156. Most jails make no significant distinctions in treatment between detainees
awaiting trial and convicts serving a criminal sentence. They are housed together, fed
together, handcuffed together, transported to and from court together, and subjected
to the same restrictions on clothing and personal possessions, visits, recreation and
exercise. There has been much litigation over such treatment, see 8B J. Moore. Federal Practice 46.04[2] (2d ed. 1980), but most of it has been laid to rest, at least
temporarily, by Bell V'.Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
157. See Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice 70-72 (1963) [hereidter cite d as Allen Report]; D. Freed & P. Wald, supra note 2, at 45; Rankin. The Effect of Pretrial
Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 641 (1964); Zeisel, Bail Recisited, 1979 Am. B. Founidation Research J. 769, 779; The UnconstitutionalAdministration of Bail: Bellamy v.
The Judges of New York City, 8 Crim. L. Bull. 459 (1972).
158. A recent study of felony dispositions in New York found that "only 56% of
felony cases entering the criminal justice system resulted in conviction for some offense; 44% were dismissed or acquitted." Felony Arrests, supra note 150, at 1. In
the District of Columbia in 1975, 1 of every 5 persons whose case was brought before
the criminal court had no charges formally filed against him. Of the remainder who
were charged, only 45% were convicted. 1977 D.C. Bail Agency Report, vupra note
35, at 21. In the federal system in fiscal 1977, the "conviction rate for all defendants
as well as felony defendants only was 79.5%." Director's Annual Report, supra note
56, at 114. Data on the percentages of defendants who were incarcerated prior to
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experienced the horrors of jail, he may have lost his job, his family
has suffered, and often the family relationship has been permanently
ruptured.' 5 9 For this sacrifice to the "interests of the community,"
he does not even get an apology. What lie does get is angry and
embittered, and an intensive education in crime from his fellow inmates. Defendants who are released on bail often have to pay for that
right, not only in money but in serious deprivations of their liberty,
16 0
all pursuant to the Bail Reform Act.
2. The Accused Versus the Convict
In his critique of preventive detention, Senator Kennedy calls attention to the fact that the Criminal Code Reform Bill, S. 1722, puts
"an end to the concept of rehabilitation as a justification for imposing
a term of imprisonment" as "a recognition by Congress that predictions of an offender's future criminal behavior cannot accurately be
made." 11 He finds it "somewhat surprising" that
those who advocate preventive detention are often in the vanguard
of sentencing reform, acknowledging that predictions of future
criminality cannot be made in the latter situation but refusing to
accept the same premise with respect to bail. This inconsistency is
all the more difficult to reconcile when one realizes that the bail
decision involves an offender who has not yet been convicted of
any crime, whereas
sentencing reform efforts involve people al16 2
ready convicted.
In light of these cogent observations, I find it mystifying that Senator
Kennedy would propose this streamlined form of preventive detention, which authorizes detentions of anyone charged with any offense, based upon the same kinds of predictions, but without
safeguards, definitions, guidelines, or time limits.
It is infinitely harder to predict that any individual will commit a
specific type of crime in a relatively short period of time-between
arrest and trial-than it is to predict that he will recidivate sometime
trial but not convicted is not readily available. A Harvard study, however, found that
26% of the pretrial detainees were not convicted. Empirical Analysis, supra note 25,
at 347. A New York study reported that 27% of detainees were not convicted. Rankin, supra note 157, at 642. In the GAO Study-, which was a random sample of all
felony' defendants in representative districts, 19% of the defendants were detained
during the entire pretrial period (an average of 60 days each). GAO Study, supra
note 36, at 20, 25. Of those, 5% were never convicted. Id. at 33. Another 12% of the
defendants were detained an average of 17 days but ultimately released. Id. at 20,
25. Of those, 17% were never convicted. Id. at 33.
159. There are other serious collateral consequences of pretrial detention. Sec
Thaler, supra note 155, at 452-54.
160. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1976) (restrictions on travel, association and place of'
abode; and placing the person in the custody of a designated person).
161. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 430 n.53.
162. Id.
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in the future. Yet it is the latter type of prediction that S. 1722 substantially disavows in its sentencing provisions as not %%ithin our present capabilities.163 No society that proclaims incompetence in predicting recidivism in the sentencing of offenders can sensibly undertake to imprison anyone on the hazy hunch that he may commit a
crime if released.
D. Curbing Crime
Section 3502 could have only a minimal effect in reducing the
crime rates even if it resulted in an incarceration of a much larger
portion of the defendant population. 164 Such imprisonments would
enormously strain the resources of law enforcement and the courts
and instill deep resentments in detainees while they were confined in
the greenhouse of crime, the local jail. A significant reduction in
crime will not be achieved until we can learn to foster respect for the
legal process and the rights that the process attempts to preserve. A
preventive detention proposal such as that contained in section 3502
could only help to destroy that respect. Despite the uncertainties
about how to curb crime, most agree that courts must have the capacity to deal adequately and intelligently with their basic tasks of adjudicating guilt and sentencing offenders. Most courts in urban areas,
including federal courts, lack this capacity and, as a consequence, a
system of adjudication has largely been replaced by a system of pleabargaining.165 To shackle this sick system with the additional burdens contained in the proposed legislation would be counterproductive.
There is no evidence that a person charged with a crime is significantly more likely to commit another crime in the near future than
others who have similar characteristics generally thought to be predictive of criminal behavior. 16 6 Assuming, however, that the exis163. For current views on sentencing, see P. O'Donnell, M. Churgin & D. Curtis,
Toward a Just and Effective Sentencing System (1977); Coffee. The Future of Selltencing Reform: Emerging Legal Issues in the Individualization of Justice. 73 Mich.
L. Rev. 1361 (1975); Kennedy, Toward a New System of Criminal Sentencing: Law
With Order, 16 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 353 (1979).
164. See notes 23-26 supra and accompanying text.
165. The Vera study of 100,739 felony arrests in New York, in 1971, discovered
that nearly half the cases resulted in dismissals, and only 15% resulted in felony
convictions. Felony Arrests, supra note 150, at 1-2. Only 62.3% of the eases went to
trial. Id. at 6. In fiscal 1977, about 15% of defendants in the federal system had a
bench or jury trial. Director's Annual Report, supra note 56, at 114.
166. It seems plausible that the crime rate among young, unemployed males is as
high as among persons charged with crime. The stresses mad deprivations associated
with being an accused obviously present temptations to crime but these may be offset
by the realization that one is under greater scrutiny as an accused mad that a crime
while pending trial is likely to be punished more severely than would otherwise be
the case.
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tance of a criminal charge is a rational segregating principle, 67 total
pretrial incarceration to prevent pretrial crimes is simply too expensive, 168 as well as too extreme. Persons who are charged with crime
can receive close surveillance by the police, and even be required to
report regularly to the police. Punishment can be enhanced for persons who commit crimes while on bail, and this can be heavily advertised. Social service agencies could make serious efforts to help the
accused deal with his problems, and financial assistance and guidance
could be provided for his dependants. These steps have never been
tried on a serious, sustained basis. Such efforts are, of course, uncertain and expensive, but not necessarily more uncertain, or more expensive, or less efficient than pretrial incarceration. Moreover, they
possess possibilities of permanence and radiation. They also have the
virtue of minimal judicial involvement in experimentation with
human life and liberty.
The nation already has the power to confine dangerous persons.
Drug addicts may be subjected to compulsory treatment, 169 and the
mentally ill who are dangerous may be hospitalized. 170 Confinement
is permissible, however, only after a fair procedure under intelligible
17 1
criteria, and on competent proof.
III. SECTION 3502: A SIMPLISTIC SOLUTION TO BAIL REFORM

Senator Kennedy's proposal purports to be a comprehensive solution to problems of bail, based on his premise that the "one impor167. See generally Hickey, Preventive Detention and the Crime of Being Dangerous, 58 Geo. L.J. 287 (1969); Thaler, supra note 155. If dismissal of charges is accepted as evidence that they were erroneous, then the data indicating that approximately 50% of cases in some urban areas and in more that 20% of all federal courts
are dismissed casts doubt on the rationality of relying on arrests for any presumption
or inference of guilt or dangerousness. At the other extreme, if it is presumed that Al
persons arrested are guilty, the criminal justice system appears unable to process
effectively some 20% to 60% of the guilty persons whom it undertakes to convict. See
note 158 supra. New York is unable to impose the statutory minimum sentence on
more than 5% of the felons it charges. Felony Arrests, supra note 150, at 1-2.
168. See note 26 supra.
169. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 665 (1962). See generally
Aronowitz, Civil Commitment of Narcotics Addicts, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 405 (1957).
170. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
171. The Court held that due process requires "clear and convincing evidence" of
the mental illness and the need for hospitalization; id. at 431-33; the accused must be
"dangerous to either himself or others and [be] in need of confined therapy." Id. at
429. On other procedural requirements, see Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378,
390-92 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085
(E.D. Mich. 1974). if § 3502 is enacted, it will not take prosecutors, and others, long
to discover that all these requirements for civil commitment can be circumvented by the
simple expedient ofbringing a criminal charge-any charge, even an infraction- then have
the judge detain or decline to release the defendant, or release him to a hospital or treatment
center.
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tant shortcoming" lies in the failure to consider candidly the question
of danger to the community. 172 Even if his proposal does not increase the use of money bail to respond to the problem of community
safety, it will not significantly reduce the practice of its unwarranted
imposition. Senator Kennedy seems to believe that the major reason
for imposing prohibitive money bail is the perception that dangerous
persons must be jailed to prevent pretrial crime. No evidence is cited
for this proposition, however, and it is inherently implausible.
A. Detention and Bail Are Functional Punishments
Pretrial incarceration and high money bail perform several significant, yet abusive, functions apart from preventing pretrial crime. Pretrial incarceration begins the process of punishment promptly and
summarily, serving strong retributive interests. 173 It eliminates uncertainties over whether the suspected miscreant %%ill be punished,
bypassing difficulties of proving guilt. Pretrial incarceration also heavily burdens the defendant in both his ability and his willingness to
contest the charges. He is not only demoralized by the inhumane
conditions he finds in jail, he soon learns that prison conditions are
better. He completely lacks control over the amount of time and attention paid to the preparation of his defense. 174 He cannot conduct
investigations or locate witnesses or other evidence helpful to his defense. Obviously, he cannot keep or find a job, or otherwise conduct
himself in a way likely to produce a lenient sentence. 175 Moreover,
the longer he remains in jail, the less he fears conviction because the
system credits the time spent in jail against a prison sentence.1 76 Pre172. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 423.
173. See generally National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice, Proceedings
and Interim Report 192-93 (1965); Allen Report, supra note 1537, at 83 n.17 (noting
practice of imposing impossible bail to force a defendant to become a prosecution
witness); R. Goldfarb, supra note 103; 8B J. Moore. Federal Practice 1 46.03 (2d ed.
1980) (noting "taste of jail" practices); Pye, The Legal Needs of the Poor: The Administration of Criminal Justice, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 286. 293 (1966). Thaler. supra
note 155.
174. See note 157 supra. The logistical burdens that being jailed impose on the
defense preparation are often noted. D. Freed and P. Wald, supra note 2. at 46. 1
illustrate these burdens as I have because of the findings of Douglas Rosenthal that
the aggressive involvement of client and lawvyer tends to produce favorable outcomes.
See D. Rosenthal, LawyTer and Client: Who's in Charge? (1974).
175. See D. Freed and P. Wald, supra note 2, at 46.
176. 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1976). This perception may. of course, be an illusion. One
circuit court has held that one is not entitled to such credit unless he was sentenced
to the statutor , maximum. Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d. 1231, 1237 (5th Cir. 1976).
Other circuits hold that one is entitled to credit regardless of the maximum. Ham v.
North Carolina, 471 F.2d 406, 408 (4th Cir. 1973). Even under this view, because a
defendant rarely gets the maximum sentence, he has no way of knowving that the
sentencing judge did not merely add the required credit to the sentence he would
have otherwise imposed. See also note 157 supra and accompanying text.
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trial incarceration might be more accurately described as "preguilty
plea" incarceration because it is an essential ingredient in the pleabargaining system through which approximately ninety percent of
177
convictions are obtained.
Jailing defendants serves the convenience of all participants in the
judicial process, except the defendant and the Marshal's service. The
defense lawyer can see the accused when he wants for as long as he
wants. 178 Police can use the defendant for lineups, show-ups, and
various other investigative devices, including interrogation. 1 79 The
prosecutor has better access to a demoralized defendant, who is more
amenable to plea bargaining.
The imposition of money bail serves a similar punitive function
even when the accused is able to meet the financial conditions to
secure release. Before posting money bail a defendant must consider
the disadvantages of this decision. If he is permitted to deposit cash
with the court, the lost access to money may adversely affect him or
his family. These may be the funds he needs to hire a lawyer or an
investigator for the preparation of his defense. Moreover, some courts
will consider a defendant who is able to post substantial cash bail to
be ineligible for court-appointed counsel. 180 In many other courts,
the posted bail money, though theoretically refundable following disposition of the case, will be confiscated either as a fine or as reimbursement to the state or government for a court-appointed lawyer,
investigator, or expert. 181 The ability of a defendant, who is charged
with or suspected of a money-producing crime, to post a cash bond

177. See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev.
50, 58 n.27 (1968).
178. Pretrial incarceration eliminates problems of notifying defendants concerning
appearance dates, breakdowns in communication, and delays in waiting for defendants to arrive in court or locate the proper courtroom. On the other hand, the
jailing of the client can be inconvenient to the lawyer if, for example, there are strict
visiting hours or the jail is far away. If the lawyer has numerous clients in the saone
jail, however, having them there is often a convenience, especially because he need
not be concerned with irritating office visits.
179. Although such interrogation will often violate the defendant's sixth amendment rights, see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 ',1977), it may still be a useful
investigative tool and defendant's statements can probably even be used against him
if he testifies in his own defense. Cf. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (prior
inconsistent statement inadmissible against defendant in prosecution's case in chief
due to lack of procedural safeguards may be used for impeachment).
180. D. Oaks, The Criminal Justice Act in the Federal District Courts 29 (1969);
L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in American State Courts
107-08 (1965).
181. See D. Oaks, supra note 180, at 28-29. But see People v. Cook, 27 Crim. L.
Rep. (BNA) 2368 (Ill. Sup. Ct. June 30, 1980), holding that a defendant's cash bail
cannot be forfeited for reimbursement of appointed counsel fees absent a fair hearing
and proof of ability to pay. See also Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974) (payment of
costs of indigent defense can be a condition of probation).
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may be taken
as evidence of guilt and may adversely affect him at
82
sentencing. 1
Surety bonds present similar disadvantages with one major addition. The premium that the defendant pays to the professional
bondsman is not returnable, regardless of the prompt trial appearance
of the defendant and the outcome of the case. The bond premium
ranges from five to fifteen percent of the face amount of the bond '8
and is often a prohibitive sum. A defendant may also have to post
collateral with the bondsman, inviting prejudicial inquiries or inferences regarding the source of the collateral and its availability to pay
fines, court-costs, or counsel fees. Thus, like pretrial incarceration, the
imposition of financial bail conditions, even when these conditions
can be met, is swift and certain summary punishment and greases the
plea-bargaining process. 1 84 The punitive functions of pretrial incarceration and money bail are far more powerful producers of abuse
than sub rosa consideration of community safety, yet section 3502
and Senator Kennedy ignore them.
B. Replacing Money Bail
Any comprehensive, serious effort at bail reform must acknowledge
these realities and deal with them. Although I do not read Senator
Kennedy's article as claiming to have done so, one witness before his
Committee believed that section 3502 would "deemphasize monetar
bail, and, [eliminate] surety bail which makes little sense in this
country today." 185 This hope rests in the increased number of nonfinancial conditions contained in that section.
Under section 3502, if a judge determines that more than the accused's signature is required to assure his appearance at trial,' 8 6 he
may impose "the least restrictive condition or combination of [the
eleven] conditions that . . . will reasonably" provide that assurance. 18 7 Section 3502 does not define "least restrictive," ,88 and unlike the Bail Reform Act, 189 does not specify the priority of the conditions. 1 90 A judge remains free to select a money bond or a surety
bond. Indeed, he may be freer, because nothing in section 3502 requires prior consideration of nonfinancial conditions, and a money
182. Some courts conduct inquiries into the source of posted bail funds. Sce D.
Oaks, supra note 180, at 59.
183. The average is about 10%. D. Freed and P. Wald, supra note 2, at 23.
184. See 8B J. Moore, Federal Practice
46.08 (2d ed. 1980) (noting punitive
uses of bail bonds, called "'taste of bail").
185. Hearings on S. 1722 and S. 1723, supra note 13, at 10328 (statement of Alan
Dershowitz).
186. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(a),(d) (1979).
187. Id. § 3502.
188. Id.
189. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1976).
190. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502 (1979).
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bond might be considered less "restrictive" than most of the other
conditions, which involve substantial deprivations of freedom.' 9 ' A
defendant may also be required to comply with both financial and
nonfinancial conditions because they need not be considered in the
alternative. Thus, a judge under section 3502 would have as much
discretion to impose money bail as he now does under the Bail Reform Act.
Money bail will never be eliminated, unless flatly prohibited, as
long as it serves punitive functions. Whether section 3502 can deemphasize its use to assure appearance, however, depends on the relative attractiveness of the nonfinancial conditions to the judge who has
the discretion to select them. In evaluating that possibility, one must
be indulged a measure of skepticism based upon present law and
practice. Only four of the nine nonfinancial conditions in section 3502
seem to have a plausible relationship to assuring appearance, and all,
according to the Committee, are already authorized under the omnibus provision of the Bail Reform Act. 192 Nevertheless, some of
these conditions could provide substantial assurance that a person will
appear for trial. The requirement that the accused maintain frequent,
periodic contact with a law enforcement agency or a pretrial service
agency 1 93 has obvious potential. This not only facilitates keeping the
accused informed of court appearance dates, it assures that one who
is inclined to flee will have little lead time in which to do so. His
track will be fresh; he may be located and encouraged to return before default. 194 Restrictions on travel or place of abode 195 serve the
same purpose. Requiring the accused to remain in the jurisdiction of
the court and to reside at a specified location196 permits periodic
determinations of his whereabouts. Requiring the defendant to maintain his job, or look for one, 19 7 also tends to tie him down, facilitates checks, and reduces incentives for flight. These conditions, however, require supervision for effectiveness.
The substitution of similar nonfinancial conditions in lieu of money
bail was extensively tried in the early 1970's in the District of Columbia, following an expansion of the District's Bail Agency.1 98 These
191. Arguably, § 3502, in contrast to the Bail Reform Act, explicitly encourages
money bail. Senator Kennedy reads § 3502 differently. See note 140 supra and accompanying text.
192. See S. Rep. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1076-78 (1980).
193. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(d)(4) (1979).
194. It may also, unfortunately, facilitate the violation of the defendant's consitutional rights. See note 179 supra.
195. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(d)(2) (1979).

196. Id. § 3502(d)(2).
197. Id. § 3502(d)(3).
198. See generally Report of the Judicial Council Committee to Study the Operation of the Bail Reform Act in the District of Columbia (1969), reprinted in Preventive Detention Hearings,supra note 10, at 703, see also W. Thomas, supra note 5, at
174.
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changes coincided with a reduced reliance on money bail and an increase in release rates. 199 The role played by more extensive reliance upon nonfinancial conditions, however, cannot be distinguished
from the contribution of an enlarged, reorganized, and more
adequately financed bail agency. Furthermore, the number of osvnrecognizance releases greatly decreased during the period, indicating
that judges were simply tacking a set of conditions on to what would
otherwise have been an own-recognizance release. 20 0 Conditions
were imposed routinely, using a checklist, often without necessity or
logic. 2 0 1 The result was wholesale violation of conditions, 2 0 2 which
inundated both the agency and the courts in paper work. 20 3 The
courts apparently ignored most of the reported violations; sanctions
were rarely imposed, and arbitrariness in the imposition of sanctions
appeared. 20 4 The system was abandoned in 1974,205 and appearance
rates have since remained fairly constant. 20 The District of Columbia experience strongly suggests that the wholesale imposition of
nonfinancial conditions has minimal effect on increasing the likelihood of appearance, and even that minimal effect may result primarily from the efficacy of supervision and the reliability of sanctions. In
the absence of adequately staffed pretrial service agencies in every
district, therefore, money bail will still play a role.
The present system frequently relegates an important function to
one of the most vilified participants in the bail process, the professional bail bondsman. Critics contend that the bondsman is merely a

199. See W. Thomas, supra note 5, at 172.
200. Id. at 173. By 1972, the number of defendants released without conditions
decreased from 40% to less than 5%. Id. The number of nonfinancial releases that
included conditions increased to 94% of the total. D.C. Bail Agency, Report for the
Period January 1, 1972-December 31, 1972, app. C.. at 2.
201. At times, conditions were contradictory. The defendant, for example, would
be required to live at a certain address and also required to stay away from the
complaining witness, who lived at the same address. See W. Thomas, supra note 5,
at 178 n.16.
202. In 1972, more than 65% of the people on release were guilty of technical
violations and one-fourth of the defendants were reported to the court as condition
violators. Id. at 175-76.
203. Id. at 174.
204. Id. at 177. In 1973, the Agency reported 2,608 violations, but sanctions were
imposed in only 58 cases. D.C. Bail Agency. Report for the Period January, 1.
1973-December 31, 1973, app. E., at 4. "[]iolation notices were largely ignored
... until the Major Violators Unit of the Police Department became involved. This
unit found that condition violations were a good justification for revoking the release
of certain 'target' defendants." W. Thomas, supra note 5. at 177.
205. W. Thomas, supra note 5. at 178.
206. Approximately a 3% failure to appear rate was experienced in 1971, D.C. Bail
Agency, Report for the Period January 1. 1971-December 31, 1971, at 4. and this
fluctuated between 2% and 5% in 1977. 1977 D.C. Bail Agency Report, viupra note
35, at 23.
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parasite on the system. 2 °7 The claim in essence is that a professional
surety bond does not tend to assure appearance for trial. The defendant himself need riot necessarily post any collateral, 20 8 and the premium he pays is gone regardless of whether he shows up for trial. 20 1
The defendant, therefore, has no incentive to appear. This argument
overlooks the important service the professional bondsman performs
for the court. He conducts whatever investigation is necessary to
satisfy him-a professional with a financial stake in the matter-that
the accused is an acceptable bail risk. This investigation is conducted
not at the expense of the Government but of the defendant. There
need be only minimal court involvement when a surety bond is set.
If, on the other hand, the defendant deposits collateral directly with
the court, substantial inquiries and paperwork are required210 with
usually no court personnel trained or equipped to handle such matters.
Cash bail, as an alternative, presents no serious administrative
problems, and, according to the Bail Reform Act, is preferred over
surety bonds. 2 1 1 Yet, cash bail is rarely used in the federal system.2 1 2 This may be explained by the facts that (1) surety bonds are
more punitive, and (2) a given amount of cash available to a
defendant-usually a very small amount-will purchase a higher degree of assurance against nonappearance than a cash deposit. The
amount at risk is much larger, albeit primarily at the risk of the
bondsman, and the bondsman is motivated not only to investigate tile

207. See A. Beeley, supra note 108, at 40; R. Goldfarb, supra note 103, at 92-118.
P. Wice, supra note 25, at 50.
208. The posting of collateral is usually a matter of free market negotiation between the accused and the bondsman. The premiums are so high that they more
than compensate for the minimal risk to the bondsman, especialy because he may
not be required to forfeit the bond when his client absconds. P. Wice, supra note
25, at 58-61.
209. Id. at 56.
210. Id. at 10-13.
211. There are two kinds of cash bail contemplated by the Bail Reform Act. One is
a deposit of cash, coupled with an undertaking to forfeit in the event of nonappearance. Another is an undertaking to pay a specified sum of money on failure to appear, which is partly collateralized by the deposit of cash, usually 10% of the face
amount. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(3),(4) (1976). Literally, the Bail Reform Act ranks only
the 10% type bond ahead of a surety bond, treating the simple deposit of cash as the
equivalent of a surety bond in subsection (4). Id.
212. See D. Oaks, supra note 180, at 29. Ten percent cash bail has been extensively used in various states, most notably Illinois, where the professional bondsman
has been eliminated. In his study of the Illinois system, Professor Thomas concluded
that the system has "'worked well." W. Thomas, supra note 5, at 199. Professor
Wice, on the other hand, says that "'[d]espite the good intentions of [the 10%] act, it
has bacldred on many poor defendants whom it was designed to help because of an
inflationary rise in the amount of bail required for certain crimes." P. Wice, supra
note 25, at 19.
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defendant but to notify him
of court appearance dates and to recap2 13
ture him if he absconds.
C. Drastic Curtailments of Civil Liberty
Enactment of section 3502 is unlikely to produce any unemployment problems among surety bondsmen. Defendants who today remain in jail for inability to post a bond will remain in jail if section
3502 is enacted, with or without its crime prevention features. Assuming, however, that even in the absence of new support services,
enactment of section 3502 might encourage some judges to select one
or more of the conditions as alternatives to money bail, I have serious
doubts about the wisdom of such "reform." Common sense and the
District of Columbia experience strongly suggest that if such conditions are actually utilized as substitutes for money bail, they %vill be
imposed wholesale. The imposition of conditions is easy, as easy as
requiring a surety bond, if done routinely by checklist. Because the
efficacy of most of the conditions is unknown, and most of them suspect, the number of conditions considered necessary to equal the deterrent effect of a surety bond is likely to be large. For ever)' person
relieved of the obligation to post a bond, fifty persons might be required to comply with a combination of conditions.
I perceive no strong objections to the standard conditions imposed
under the Bail Reform Act, such as remaining in the jurisdiction or
living in a particular place. The infringement on liberty involved in
some of the other conditions, however, is alarming, and represents a
high price to pay for marginal reform of money bail practices. Section
3502, under the aegis of assuring appearance at trial, explicitly authorizes the imposition of conditions that the Committee concedes are
related only to community safety. 214 Indeed, man), of these conditions of release were "drawn from those conditions deemed suitable for
imposition of a sentence of probation, the nearest parallel." 2 1 5 There
may be some sense in drawing a parallel between a convicted offender and an accused found to be dangerous, but the imposition of
sanctions, which substitute for imprisonment, merely to augment an
expectation that the accused will appear for trial is untenable. The
absurdity is compounded because some of these conditions cannot
even be imposed on a convicted offender under current law,2 16 or
even under S. 1722.217
213. P. Wice, supra note 25, at 56-62.
214. S.Rep. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1078 (1980).
215. Id. at 1076.
216. See Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1945) In re Mannino,
14 Cal. App. 3d 953, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1971); People v. Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 231

N.W. 95 (1930); Note, Limitations Upon Trial Court Discretion in Imposing Conditions of Probation, 8 Ga. L. Rev. 466 (1974).
217. The proposed statute specifies the conditions that may be imposed upon probation. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2103 (1979). There is nothing there resembl-
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Conditions of release that require the accused to "refrain from
ex2 18
or
cessive use of alcohol, or any use of a. . . controlled substance"
"undergo available medical or psychiatric treatment, including
treatment for drug or alcohol dependency" 21 9 have only the most remote
and speculative connection to appearance for trial 22 0 and far overreach 221 those discrete situations in which there is a plausible connection. Similarly, a prohibition against associations 222 has no apparent relation to customary bail risks. In consideration of the likelihood
of flight, the judge may order the accused released in the custody of a
third person and require that person to offer reasonable assurance not
only that the accused "will appear as required" but that he "will not
pose a danger to . . . the community." 2 23 Even before his dangerousness is put in issue, the burden can thus be shifted to the accused
to prove that he is not a peril to the public.
The imposition of some conditions may even have an adverse effect on appearance rates. For example, a defendant may be released4
22
on condition that he "avoid all contact with potential witnesses."
This condition is redundant as a protective device, because both
existing law and S. 1722 provide ample sanctions for injuring, intimidating, or threatening witnesses.2 25 Its sole function would
be to inhibit lawful, constitutionally protected defense preparation. 226 The propensity of an arrestee to investigate his case, to preing "severe restrictions on the person's freedom, associations, or activities that tie
court deems appropriate." Id. § 3502(d)(11). Moreover, although many of the authorized probation conditions are similar to those in § 3502, they are often narrower;
for example, the probationer may be required to "refrain . . . from engaging in a
specified occupation . .. bearing a reasonably direct relationship to the conduct constituting the offense." Id. § 2103(b)(6) (emphasis added). See also S. Rep. No. 553,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 964 (1980) ("the court may not impose a condition of probation
which results in a deprivation of liberty for the defendant unless that deprivation is
'reasonably necessary' to carry out the purposes of the sentence").
218. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(d)(5) (1979).
219. Id. § 3502(d)(8).
220. In contrast, these requirements may have a logical relation to assuring community safety. See notes 118-20 supra and accompanying text.
221. A prohibition against "excessive use of alcohol, or any use of a. . . controlled
substance, as defined in . . . (21 U.S.C. 802) . . . without a prescription," S. 1722,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(d)(5), is unacceptably vague. What is "excessive" use of
alcohol is a matter of personal prejudice and a section as lengthy and prolix as 21
U.S.C. § 802 (1976) gives little guidance to the determination of a "controlled substance." It includes not only "hard drugs," like heroin and cocaine, but hundreds of
hallucinogenics, stimulants, and depressants. Id.
222. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(d)(2),(tl) (1979).
223. Id. § 3502(d)(1).
224. Id. § 3502(d)(6).
225. Id. § 1323. An arrestee who violates such provisions will not only have to
answer these charges, but also can have his release revoked. Id. § 3507,
226. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820-21 (1975) (recognizing that it is
the defendant who is defending and the lawyer, if any, who is his "assistant"). As
noted above, see note 149 supra, many defendants who are indigent have no right to
counsel as the Constitution is presently beng interpreted. The Court observed in
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pare a defense in a lawful manner, does not remotely suggest that he
will not appear for trial. On the contrary, it suggests that he intends
to appear.
The imposition of these severe restrictions of personal freedom,
without even a finding of danger to the community, is irrational and
constitutionally dubious. Some of these conditions are deprivations
that cannot otherwise be inflicted by the legal system 227 and most
cannot be imposed without a clear demonstration of need and a due
process hearing. 22 8 In contrast, although the Committee acknowledges that there is little data demonstrating the relationship of these
conditions either to appearance for trial or to dangerousness, 2 9 it invites judges to be "inventive" in their utilization.230 It has encouraged inventiveness by removing all significant procedural require231
ments.
Section 3502 provides limited access to appellate review of the imposition of such conditions.2 32 It is not available to one who accepts
the conditions and obtains his release, even if he subsequently rues
the coercive bargain. Review, for what it is worth, is available only to
one who "after twenty-four hours . . . continues to be detained as a
result of his inability to meet the conditions of release." 233 The
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), that one of the most compelling reasons for "freedom before conviction" is that it "permits the unhampered preparation of a defense."
Id. at 4.
227. It is most unlikely, for example, that the criteria required for civil commitment, see notes 162-63 supra and accompanying text, could be satisfied in the case of
most alcoholics or users of nonaddictive drugs. See generally Powell v. Texas, 39"2
U.S. 514 (1968). It is one thing to conclude that such activities can be criminally
punished, but quite another to conclude that a defendant may be institutionalized
and treated for his sickness, or jailed for refusal to be treated. Id. at 532. Regulation
of "associations," S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(d)(2),(11) (1979) raises the
gravest of problems under the first amendment. See T. Emerson, The System of
Freedom of Expression 289-96, 425-33 (1970). The power of the government to grant
or deny benefits or other rights on the ground of assertion or exercise of fundamental
rights, or, to obtain valid surrenders of those rights by offering benefits or imposing
deprivations, is quite limited. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
228. See notes 169-70 supra and accompanying text.
229. It is "under our existing knowledge . .. virtually impossible to single out in
statutory form the kinds of defendants, the kinds of offenses, and the kinds of factors
that will make for a reasonable total assessment of the likelihood of future flight or
dangerousness." S. Rep. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1077-78 (1980).
230. Id. at 1077.
231. A judge complies with § 3502 if the record shows that he "based his decision
on ...considerations set" forth in the section. Id. at 1085. Apparently, the judge
must indicate that he has considered one or more of the characteristics of the charge
and the accused specified in § 3502(f) and imposed "the least restrictive condition or
combination of conditions . . .that wvill reasonably assure the appearance of the person for trial." S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(a) (1979).
232. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502 (g) (1979).
233. Id.
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defendant who remains in jail because he is unwilling, rather than
unable, to accept compulsory hospitalization or a prohibition on unsavory associates or radical activities, is apparently denied access to
appellate review. The defendant who accepts conditional release faces
two obvious choices. He may either abide by the conditions of release, no matter how irrational or restrictive, or he may defy them
and run the risk of incarceration. 234 Neither alternative is likely to
engender a deep respect for the judicial system.
Because little is known about the causes of failure to appear, it is
possible that some of these conditions of release might ultimately
prove to be closely related to appearance for trial. Unfortunately,
their "inventive" employment in bail decisionmaking and the absence
of controls would obscure any meaningful evidence of their effectiveness.2 3 5 Any experiment that deprives persons of basic freedoms
must be carefully designed to yield significant data; section 3502 is
not so designed.
D. The Fundamental Question
Any serious proposal for bail reform should recognize and resolve
the fundamental question, skirted by the Bail Reform Act, by section
3502, by virtually all court decisions and most commentaries: what is
the degree of risk of nonappearance the bail decision may appropriately assume? How many false imprisonments-erroneous predictions of nonappearance- should be tolerated to prevent a single false
release-erroneous prediction of appearance? Professor Foote argues
that the appropriate ratio is one to one. It is "Just as important for the
administration of the criminal law not to lock up an accused unnecessarily as it is not to permit a defendant to escape trial by flight." 2 30 If
this hypothesis is accepted, one may doubt, as Foote does, that it is
sensible to imprison anyone, other than a previous absconder, simply
to assure his appearance at trial.
Tools for predicting likelihood of flight are almost as rudimentary as
those for predicting dangerousness. 2 37 We know, for example, that
234. Id. § 3502(j).
235. Conditional releases might appear to be effective if the proportion of defendants released on them and without money bail increases and the nonappearance rate
remains fairly constant. This inference, however, is unwarranted if the proportion of
unconditioned, own-recognizance releases diminishes, as it did in the District of Columbia. When several conditions are imposed simultaneously, it is virtually impossible
to determine their individual relation to appearance rates. See W. Thomas, supra
note 5, at 173. Moreover, inferences would not be justified if the level of support of
bail and pretrial service agencies fluctuates during the period. See notes 198-206
supra and accompanying text.
236. Foote, The Coming ConstitutionalCrises in Bail- (pt. II), 113 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1125, 1170 (1965).
237. The empirical research is collected and evaluated in National Center for State
Courts, An Evaluation of Policy Related Research on The Effectiveness of Pretrial
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family ties and roots in the community correlate wvith appearance, but
there is no data indicating that their absence correlates with
flight. 238 Moreover, an intelligent assessment of risk of flight requires evaluation not only of the seriousness of the charge and the
likelihood of conviction, 2 39 but of a host of individual factors that
must be acquired and verified. This information carries a high price
tag. It seems entirely possible that virtually all failures to appear can
be eliminated if these resources were
allocated to locating and apprehending the alleged absconder. 240 The typical criminal accused
rarely has sufficient funds to leave town, much less the country. The
only way for a person to abscond successfully, and remain in the
United States, is to avoid arrest. Once he is arrested and fingerprinted, his flight is over. Moreover, it is simply not true that the
system can tolerate no absconders. 24 1 We need to make a serious
assessment of the likelihood of successful flight, the costs of recapture, the costs of bail investigation and supervision, and the costs of
detention, then reorder our priorities on the basis of facts.
IV. TRUE REFORM
It is substantially easier to criticize than to create a bail reform
proposal. A number of things, however, should have become obvious
from our experience with the Bail Reform Act and preventive detention. Efforts at individualized bail determinations are doomed unless
someone with an interest in obtaining pretrial release 2 42 is placed in
Release Programs (1975). The conclusion is that "alithough some useful research has
been done in this area, we do not know what factors are most likely to be reliable
indicators of future flight or future crime." Id. at 65.
238. See Wald, supra note 5, at 199.
239. This is a nearly universal assumption, justifying special standards of release
for those on appeal and those facing capital charges. Even this assumption has been
cast into some doubt by one study that found that persons charged with serious
crimes had a much lower failure to appear rate than defendants charged with relatively minor misdemeanors. S. Shaffer, Bail and Parole Jumping in Manhattan in
1967, at 25-28 (1970). But see note 241 infra.
240. There are a host of reasons for failure to appear, including death, illness,
accident, and confusion about dates and obligations. The true fugitive is virtually
unknown in many courts. See W. Thomas, supra note 5, at 104.
241. In some jurisdictions, arrestees are encouraged to "abscond" after posting
bail, the forfeiture being considered an efficient and adequate punishment for relatively minor offenses. This hypocrisy is even built into the proposed statute. S. 1720,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502(k) (1979). According to the Committee, permitting forfeiture of collateral in satisfaction of the charges is in accord with present law, 18
U.S.C. § 3 14 6(g) (1976), and practice whereby "several hundred thousand offenses
are disposed of annually in that manner in the Federal courts." S. Rep. No. 553,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1081 (1980).
242. Defense counsel are expected to perform these tasks in most jurisdictions.
but this expectation has little basis in reality. See United States v. Leathers, 412
F.2d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (it is a judicial officer's duty to inquire into conditions
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a position and given the resources necessary to make the investigations and recommendations and to provide supervision. An
adequately funded bail agency is the appropriate candidate for these
tasks. This agency must be sufficiently insulated from prosecutorial
and judicial control to act effectively on behalf of the accused yet
remain sufficiently responsible to the' court to have credibility.
Neither a bail agency nor a court can obtain the information required
for an intelligent, informed bail decision if this information concerning the accused may be used against him in guilt determination or
sentencing. 243 A quasi-privileged relationship between the accused
and the agency should be provided, and the court should be forbidden to use evidence offered by the defendant in a bail hearing except
in a prosecution for perjury. A bail agency should also have ample
resources to assist the accused and his family in adjusting to the new
status of a criminal accused, and to help, if needed, in obtaining
employment, welfare, counseling, and treatment.
None of the foregoing proposals, however, will be effective if the
institutional interests that favor pretrial detention or money bail remain in place. There can be no lasting reform until these interests are
rearranged. To borrow Senator Kennedy's phrase for a very different
purpose, a "new balance [must] be struck" 24 4 between the "interests
of ... the community and the accused." 2 45 The plea-bargaining system, which feeds ofl' punitive bail practices, must be reformed so that
the adjudication and sentencing functions are less dependent upon
bail decisions. Short of a total overhaul of the system, however, there
are measures that would reduce the institutional bias against release,
and counteract the pressures for punitive use of bail.
The courts should recognize the probability that pretrial incarceration prejudices an accused in the ultimate disposition of his case. 2 4 6
An accused who is convicted after trial or even, perhaps, upon a plea
of guilty or nolo contendre, should be permitted to assert that his
pretrial incarceration contributed to this outcome. 24 7 The prosecuof release and defense counsel should assist); Wald, supra note 5, at 186; Note,
Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A
New Look After United States v. Decoster, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 752, 760 (1980). Such
counsel often lack the expertise to perform initial tasks adequately; they also usually
lack the motivation or the time. Their representations are not credited by the courts
and their duties to their clients preclude effective supervision of pretrial release. See
P. Wice, supra note 25, at 48; Wald, supra note 5, at 186. See generally Bazelon,
The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 44 (1973). Indeed, in
some districts the prosecutor conducts the bail interview of the accused. 8B J. Moore,
Federal Practice 46.06 n.5 (2d ed. 1980).
243. See note 130 supra and accompanying text.
244. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 433.
245. Id. at 435.
246. See note 157 supra and accompanying text.
247. Violations of the Bail Reform Act or the eighth amendment, including the
right to effective assistance of counsel in the bail process, are virtually always consid-
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tion should then be required to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt"
that there was no prejudice or that the denial of pretrial release was
lawful. 248 If that burden cannot be met, the conviction or sentence
should be set aside. Congress or the courts should prohibit inquiries
into the source of money for bail and prohibit the consideration of
such matters in determinations of eligibility for counsel or other investigative aids, or in sentencing.2 4 9
Congress should also create a compensation fund and establish a
right of action for every defendant whose pretrial liberty was denied
but who is ultimately exonerated. This right of action slould also extend to recovery of money expended for the bond premiums required
20
to purchase his freedom. 5
Finally, pretrial detainees should be housed in facilities separate
from convicted prisoners, under conditions appropriate to the function of their detention, assuring appearance for trial. They should be
allowed as much liberty, including relatively free access to familN,
friends, lawyers, and recreational and educational opportunities, as is
consistent with the limited purpose of their detention.
CONCLUSION

The proponents of S. 1722 should be commended for their efforts
to correct perceived abuses of the present system, but their product
must be condemned for the narrowness of its perception and its
ered to have been mooted by the conviction, through misapplication of the harmless
error doctrine. See, e.g., Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 397-98 tD.C. Cir.
1970) (en bane); Barnard v. United States, 342 F.2d 309, 313-14 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 948 (1965). But see Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15 (1967);
Kinney v. Lenon, 425 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1970).
248. This is the standard of harmless error involving violations of constitutional
rights adopted in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-24 (1967). Given the presumptions in the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (1976), the setting of
financial conditions or severe restrictions on personal liberty should be unlawful absent evidence in the record of a likelihood of flight. This will seldom be the case
unless the defendant has previously absconded or attempted to do so.
249. Inquiries into a defendant's wealth are relevant to determinations of indigency and the capacity to pay fines, but fines are not sensible sentences for perpetrators of serious crime other than corporations. Furthermore, few defendants will
seek court-appointed counsel when they can afford to hire their own. See Casper,
supra note 150. My proposal, moreover, does not prohibit inquiries regarding indigency for services under the Criminal Justice Act, it merely limits them.
250. See Frankel, Precentive Restraints and Just Compensation. Towcard a Sanetion Law of the Future, 78 Yale L.J. 229, 256-67 (1968). A suggestive model is contained in S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 4111-4113 (1979), dealing with victim
compensation. There would be problems in determining entitlements to compensation. Acquittal would be too narrow a criterion. On the other hand, using dismissal to
trigger the right may be too generous, encompassing 10% to 20% of federal defendants. See note 158 supra and accompanying text. That should, however, be the
ultimate aim. Some method might also be required to preclude waivers, so that the
right to compensation would not merely become another chip for plea bargaining.
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methods. If section 3502 is neither abandoned by its supporters nor
rejected by Congress, the courts should declare large portions of it
unconstitutional. Apart from the misguided and self-destructive preventive detention aspects of section 3502, its greatest vice is that it is
disguised as reform. The certain result of this proposal would be to
exacerbate existing abuses and threaten fundamental liberties. The
problems of the bail system are numerous and pervasive, but better
left undisturbed than obscured by experimentation with what is at
best a patent palliative.

